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Thompson: The Eggsploitation of the United States' Organ and Egg Donation S

THE EGGSPLOITATION OF THE UNITED
STATES’ ORGAN AND EGG DONATION
SYSTEMS
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the development of organ donation, the United States has
operated under an altruistic model, but this approach has failed to
address the shortage of transplantable organs throughout the nation.1
The possibility of implementing a market system for organ donation was
discussed throughout the 1990s but never adopted.2 By examining the
drawbacks of the current organ donation process and considering
Congress’s reasoning behind prohibiting a market system for organ
donation—while allowing compensation for female egg donation—this
Note provides an update on why adopting a market approach to organ
donation is timely.3 The following two individuals who received the gift
of life illustrate the discrepancies between the two donation systems.
Colter Meinart is a nine-year old boy who, like the average secondgrader, obsesses over Star Wars memorabilia, completes math problems
using his fingers, and bolts from school as soon as the bell rings.4
However, beneath Colter’s sweatshirts and backpack is a pump that
provides him with medicine twenty-four hours a day—medicine that
prevents his heart from failing.5 At younger than a day old, the doctors
discovered that Colter suffered from hypoplastic left heart syndrome, “a
birth defect that affects normal blood flow through the heart.”6 The
doctors informed the Meinart family that Colter was missing the left
See Charles C. Dunham IV, “Body Property”: Challenging the Ethical Barriers in Organ
Transplantation to Protect Individual Autonomy, 17 ANNALS HEALTH L. 39, 59 (2008)
(recognizing that the government’s altruistic approach has been failing for several
decades); U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Organ Donation:
The Process,
ORGANDONOR.GOV, http://www.organdonor.gov/about/organdonationprocess.html (last
visited Aug. 15, 2013) (identifying that the United States operates under an altruistic organ
donation system).
2
See, e.g., Gregory S. Crespi, Overcoming the Legal Obstacles to the Creation of a Futures
Market in Bodily Organs, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 7 (1994) (insisting the adoption of a futures
market for organ donation would benefit the organ shortage).
3
See infra Part III (analyzing the shortcomings of organ donation legislation and
analogizing the organ donation and egg donation processes).
4
Dan Lieberman & Ely Brown, The Waiting Game: 9 Organ Transplant Patients Fight to
Survive, ABC NEWS (May 1, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/waiting-game-organtransplant-patients-fight-survive/story?id=16245341#.ULGNh47_Q20.
5
Id.
6
Id.; see Congenital Heart Defects: Facts About Hypoplastic Left Heart Syndrome, CENTERS
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/heartdefects/hlhs.
html (last updated Mar. 28, 2013) (defining hypoplastic left heart syndrome as “a birth
defect that affects normal blood flow through the heart”).
1
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portion of his heart.7 At only six-weeks old, Colter received a heart
transplant.8 The transplant was successful and allowed Colter to live the
life of an average child—attending school and playing with his friends—
until the summer of 2011 when Colter’s heart again began to fail.9
The once rambunctious young boy and his parents were forced to
anxiously await a second life-saving heart transplant.10 However,
Colter’s failing heart was no longer the Meinart family’s sole concern
because doctors discovered that the medicine Colter was taking to
compensate for his heart condition had also caused damage to one of his
kidneys.11 Immediately, doctors placed Colter on the kidney transplant
waiting list out of fear that his kidney would also soon fail.12 In some
respects Colter was fortunate because after nine months of waiting he
received a heart transplant.13 Days later, he was on the road to recovery
and returned to obsessing about anything relating to Star Wars.14
However, the successful transplant surgery does not mark the end of
Colter’s recovery because he and his family now must wait to see if he
will also need a kidney transplant.15
The second individual, Melinda, is a woman who wanted
desperately to have a child of her own.16 Melinda and her husband
spent seven years undergoing in vitro fertilization treatments, but the
treatments were unsuccessful, resulting in numerous miscarriages.17
Finally the doctors presented Melinda with an alternative option, an
Lieberman & Brown, supra note 4; see Congenital Heart Defects: Facts About Hypoplastic
Left Heart Syndrome, supra note 6 (explaining that hypoplastic left heart syndrome is a
condition that occurs during pregnancy when the left side of the baby’s heart does not
develop properly).
8
Lieberman & Brown, supra note 4.
9
See id. (recognizing that Jeff Meinart, Colter’s father, asked the doctor whether he and
his wife should hold Colter back from running and playing, and the doctor responded they
should “let him do what he wants”).
10
See id. (identifying that after about seven years healthcare professionals started to
analyze whether another transplant was necessary).
11
Id.
12
See id. (pointing out that the doctors thought Colter may also need a kidney
transplant).
13
See id. (explaining that Colter asked his mother where his heart and kidney were
going to come from, and she responded “when another child loses his life, that that’s where
they are going to get the heart and kidney from”).
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
See Gratitude Details:
Melinda’s Letter, COLO. CENTER FOR REPROD. MED.,
http://www.coloeggdonor.com/Gratitude/Details/Melinda_s_Letter.aspx (last visited
Aug. 15, 2013) (containing Melinda’s letter, which expresses her desire to raise children).
17
See id. (explaining that, as a couple, Melinda and her husband experienced nine years
of infertility and tried to conceive a child using in vitro fertilization during seven of those
years).
7
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option that could give her the family she always dreamed of having. The
doctors informed Melinda that her only alternative was the egg donor
program.18
Originally, Melinda and her husband decided against egg donation
because they believed that it would be too difficult to love a child that
was not their own. 19 Four years later, the couple came to terms with the
idea that egg donation may provide the only means for them to have the
Although Melinda was concerned about
family they desired.20
developing a bond and expressing love for a child who was not
biologically her own, her outlook regarding egg donation changed after
the birth of her newborn.21 As soon as Melinda held her child and their
eyes met, she fell in love, and she believes that the gift of a child is the
most precious gift she has ever received.22 The egg donation process
changed Melinda’s life and family for the better, and it is all because a
wonderful and beautiful woman gave what Melinda describes as “the
best gift anyone could ever give, the gift of life.”23
The main difference between Colter’s and Melinda’s stories is that
Melinda had the option of obtaining the gift of life—through a newborn
child—by compensating a young woman who chose to donate her
eggs.24 Unlike Melinda, federal law prohibits Colter’s family from

18
See id. (identifying that doctors presented the egg donor program to Melinda and her
husband as an alternative option).
19
See id. (explaining Melinda’s and her husband’s reaction to the egg donor program as
hesitant because they believed that they could not bear to “go that route”).
20
See id. (explaining that Melinda and her husband later understood that donors are
people, like them, who could help her and her husband have a child).
21
See id. (stating Melinda believed that she could not love a baby that was not truly her
own).
22
See id. (recognizing that their child’s egg donor blessed Melinda and her husband with
a “precious gift”). Melinda’s letter identified that she immediately loved the baby and her
love has since grown stronger over time. Id.
23
Id.
24
See Compensation, COLO. CENTER FOR REPROD. MED., http://www.coloeggdonor.com/
Compensation.aspx (last visited Aug. 15, 2013) (recognizing that egg donors receive $5000
following the completion of their first egg donation, and that amount can increase to $5500
for a donor’s second or third donation); Egg Donor Compensation, EGG DONATION, INC.,
https://www.eggdonor.com/donors/egg-donor-compensation/ (last visited Aug. 15,
2013) (recognizing that egg donors receive anywhere from $5000 to $10,000 for donating
their eggs); see also Cost Estimate for Egg Donation, EGG DONOR PROGRAM,
http://www.eggdonation.com/PDF/Cost_Estimate__Egg_Donation.pdf (last visited Aug.
15, 2013) (providing a list of the various fees associated with the donation process). But see
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:122 (2008) (expressly prohibiting “[t]he sale of human ovum,
fertilized human ovum, or human embryo”); John A. Robertson, Legal Uncertainties in
Human Egg Donation, in NEW WAYS OF MAKING BABIES: THE CASE OF EGG DONATION 175,
182–83 (Cynthia B. Cohen ed., 1996) (examining whether prosecution for the sale of eggs
has occurred under various state statutes that expressly prohibit the sale of human organs).
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paying compensation to any person willing to donate a heart or kidney
to Colter.25 Therefore, while Colter’s kidney continues to fail he will
remain on the kidney transplant waiting list, along with 97,229 other
patients.26 Even after already undergoing two heart transplants, Colter
may not have the opportunity to live the life that his parents imagined
for him. The current organ donation process could deprive the Meinart
family of their own child and strip Colter of the gift of life he received
nine years ago.
So what is it that makes Melinda more worthy of obtaining the gift of
life compared to Colter? Currently, 119,246 people nationwide await an
organ transplant, but between January and May of 2013, only 11,579
people received the transplant they needed.27 This Note provides an indepth critique of the organ donation process currently operating within
the United States.28 Part II reviews the history and legal framework of
the rights recognized in the human body and also explores the organ and

25
See 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (2012) (stating it is “unlawful for any person to knowingly
acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable consideration for use
in human transplantation”).
26
See
Data,
ORGAN
PROCUREMENT
&
TRANSPLANTATION
NETWORK,
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/data/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2013) (stating that as of 5:03
p.m. on August 15, 2013, 97,229 people were on the kidney transplant waiting list); see also
The Kidney Transplant Waiting List, UPTODATE.COM, http://www.uptodate.com/contents/
the-kidney-transplant-waiting-list (last visited Aug. 15, 2013) (identifying that as of late
2010, approximately 93,000 patients were on the kidney transplant list and the kidney
transplant list has expanded by 3000 to 4000 patients each year).
27
See Data, supra note 26 (stating that as of 5:03 p.m. on August 5, 2013, 119,246 people
were on the waiting list for an organ but doctors only performed 11,579 transplants
between January 2013 and May 2013); see also The Kidney Transplant Waiting List, supra note
26 (identifying that in late 2010, “approximately 93,000 patients were registered on the
kidney transplant waiting list at the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) in the
United States”); The Troubling Shortage of Organ Donors in the U.S., FORBES (Feb. 28, 2011,
9:48 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/marcsiegel/2011/02/28/the-troubling-shortageof-organ-donors-in-the-u-s/ (explaining that in the United States there is a large organ
shortage and this shortage is especially prominent when it comes to needing a kidney).
28
See Damien Gayle, An Organ Is Sold Every Hour, WHO Warns: Brutal Black Market on the
Rise Again Thanks to Diseases of Affluence, MAIL ONLINE (May 27, 2012, 11:52 PM),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-2150932/An-organ-sold-hour-WHO-warnsBrutal-black-market-rise-thanks-diseases-affluence.html (recognizing the World Health
Organization’s fear that the illegal trade of organs has again developed); U.S. Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs., The Need Is Real: Data, ORGANDONOR.GOV, http://www.organ
donor.gov/about/data.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2013) (providing statistics that illustrate
the increased need for organ transplantation). But see Talk of the Nation: Human Organ
Trade, NPR (Dec. 9, 2003), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyID=
1538955 (discussing the illegal trading of human organs that occurred in Africa). See
generally Why Be an Organ Donor?, N.Y. ORGAN DONOR NETWORK, http://www.donatelife
ny.org/about-donation/why-be-an-organ-donor/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2013) (pointing out
that by donating one’s organs a person has the potential to “save a life”).
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egg donation processes.29 Part III analyzes why the courts and
legislature have chosen to treat the two donation systems differently and
also examines the similarities and differences between the egg donation
Finally, Part IV proposes an
and organ donation processes.30
amendment to the National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 (“NOTA”) and
suggests that Congress should implement a supervised market approach
to organ and egg donation.31 These amendments will allow for a more
holistic approach to the donation systems and will increase the supply of
organs to help resolve the United States’ organ shortage.
II. BACKGROUND
To gain a better understanding of the need for a supervised market
approach, this Part provides an overview of the history of organ
donation in the United States and considers the critical aspects of the
organ and egg donation processes.32 First, Part II.A describes the cases
that played a critical role in identifying the property rights associated
with the human body.33 Second, Part II.B discusses the model codes
adopted by numerous state legislatures and considers NOTA, a federal
law that prohibits the sale of human organs.34 Third, Part II.C explains
the process of organ donation for deceased and living donors.35 Finally,
Part II.D discusses female egg donation and the various risks associated
with the procurement process.36
A. The Legal Framework
Throughout history, courts have interpreted the rights associated
with a human body differently depending on whether the person is

29
See infra Part II (discussing the property rights associated with the human body, the
model codes and statutes governing organ donation, and the processes of donating organs
and female eggs).
30
See infra Part III (analyzing Congress’s prohibition on the sale of human organs and
the similarities between the organ and egg donation systems).
31
See infra Part IV (suggesting an amendment to the National Organ Transplant Act of
1984 (“NOTA”) that would reconcile the differences between the United States’ approach
to organ and egg donation, while also reducing the shortage of human organs).
32
See infra Parts II.A–D (discussing property rights in the human body, the prohibition
of selling one’s organs, and the organ and egg donation processes).
33
See infra Part II.A (discussing the judiciary’s interpretation of property rights in a
deceased’s and living person’s human organs).
34
See infra Part II.B (considering the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (“UAGA”) and
NOTA).
35
See infra Part II.C (explaining the organ donation process for deceased and living
donors).
36
See infra Part II.D (exploring the female egg donation process).
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deceased or living.37 This Part discusses these differences and the recent
case law that has interpreted the rights associated with the human
body.38 First, Part II.A.1 explains the recognition of a quasi-property
right in a decedent’s body.39 Second, Part II.A.2 elaborates on the lack of
property interests that a person retains in his living body and the
subparts thereof.40 Only after considering the rights that courts have
recognized in a human body can one gain a better understanding of the
critical movement toward enacting model codes and federal legislation
that prevents the sale of the human body and its subparts.41
1.

Property Interests in a Decedent’s Organs

Prior to the creation of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (“UAGA”)
in 1968, common law principles governed organ transplantation.42
Originally, under the English common law, courts recognized a property
right in the deceased body.43 For example, old British courts permitted a
creditor to arrest the body of a deceased debtor for any debts owed.44
However, after consideration of moral principles, the courts began to
condemn such practices and denied that persons maintained an absolute
property right to a corpse.45 For instance, in Regina v. Sharpe, the British
37
See infra Parts II.A.1–2 (discussing that the next-of-kin maintains a quasi-property
interest in a deceased’s body, but a living person does not possesses an absolute property
right in his own body).
38
See infra Part II.A.2 (explaining the lack of property rights a living person maintains in
his body parts).
39
See infra Part II.A.1 (discussing the recognition of property rights by the English and
American courts).
40
See infra Part II.A.2 (identifying case law that shaped an understanding of a lack of
property rights in a living person’s body).
41
See infra Part II.B (discussing the model codes and federal legislation that prohibits the
sale of the human body and its subparts).
42
See Crespi, supra note 2, at 10 (identifying that, before the Second World War, common
law principles guided organ transplantation throughout the United States). See generally
UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1968) (providing the language of the UAGA, as enacted in
1968).
43
See, e.g., R. v. Cheere, (1825) 107 Eng. Rep. 1294 (K.B.); 4 B. & C. 902. The government
indicted the defendant for interfering and preventing the burial of John Dawes. Id. at 1295.
The court held that the indictment for the alleged offense was invalid because it did not
appear the Clerk had a right to bury the corpse, and the threats allegedly spoken by the
defendant were not included within the indictment. Id. at 1296.
44
See Monique C. Gorsline & Rachelle L.K. Johnson, Note, The United States System of
Organ Donation, the International Solution, and the Cadaveric Organ Donor Act: “And the
Winner Is . . .,” 20 J. CORP. L. 5, 11 (1994) (stating that historically, “a creditor could force
payment of a debt by personally attaching the debtor and placing the debtor in prison”).
45
See, e.g., Jones v. Ashburnham, (1804) 102 Eng. Rep. 905 (K.B.) 909; 4 East 455, 465
(condemning the practice of arresting a debtor as being “contrary to every principle of law
and moral feeling”).
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court upheld the conviction of a man charged with illegally entering his
mother’s grave and removing her corpse.46 The court held that persons,
including the next-of-kin, did not possess a property right to a family
member’s remains.47
Similarly, the United States judiciary has hesitated to acknowledge
an absolute property right to a deceased’s body.48 American courts
recognize an individual’s right to determine the fate of his remains
through the creation of a contract or will.49 However, in circumstances
where a decedent fails to memorialize his wishes, the decedent’s family
retains the ability to decide the disposition of the decedent’s corpse.50 In
46
See Regina v. Sharpe, (1857) 169 Eng. Rep. 959 (Crim. App.) 960; Dears. & Bell 159,
161–62 (laying out the facts of the case).
47
See id. (holding that there is not an absolute property right to a corpse).
48
See, e.g., Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786, 795–97 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding
that California infringed on the dignity of the deceased children by extracting their corneas
without the parents’ consent); Dougherty v. Mercantile-Safe Deposition & Trust Co., 387
A.2d 244, 246 n.2 (Md. 1978) (“It is universally recognized that there is no property in a
dead body in a commercial or material sense.”); Keyes v. Kenkel, 78 N.W. 649, 649 (Mich.
1899) (holding that the action brought against funeral directors, seeking replevin of a
human corpse, could not succeed); see also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982) (explaining that “[p]roperty rights in a physical thing have
been described as the rights ‘to possess, use and dispose of it’” (quoting United States v.
General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945))); Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338
U.S. 1, 5 (1949) (“The value compensable under the Fifth Amendment, therefore, is only
that value which is capable of transfer from owner to owner and thus of exchange for some
equivalent.”). But see Erik S. Jaffe, Note, “She’s Got Bette Davis[‘s] Eyes”: Assessing the
Nonconsensual Removal of Cadaver Organs Under the Takings and Due Process Clauses, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 528, 528 (1990) (contending that property rights exist in the body and the
subparts thereof). See generally BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1335 (9th ed. 2009) (defining
property). Black’s Law Dictonary defines property as “[t]he right to possess, use, and enjoy
a determinate thing (either a tract of land or a chattel); the right of ownership,” and
recognizes the most common usage is a “bundle of rights.” Id.
49
See, e.g., Gorsline & Johnson, supra note 44, at 10 (pointing out that under American
law persons can supervise the disposal of their remains by executing a will or contract).
50
See id. (recognizing that if the decedent fails to exercise the right to dispose of his
remains, then the decedent’s family may exercise the right); see also Whaley v. Cnty. of
Tuscola, 58 F.3d 1111, 1114 (6th Cir. 1995) (explaining that a common law right to possess
the body for burial purposes and a right to bring a claim against persons who disturb the
body vests in the next-of-kin); Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 1991)
(holding that the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution protected a widow’s right to
her deceased husband’s body, including his corneas); Cohen v. Groman Mortuary, Inc., 41
Cal. Rptr. 481, 483 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (identifying that a quasi-property right to the
corpse for burial purposes existed); Crocker v. Pleasant, 778 So. 2d 978, 985 (Fla. 2001)
(recognizing that the narrow construction given to the statute in an earlier decision does
not translate into the general conclusion that the Fourteenth Amendment should not
protect the right to possess a decedent’s remains for burial); Georgia Lions Eye Bank, Inc. v.
Lavant, 335 S.E.2d 127, 128 (Ga. 1985) (holding that courts formulated the quasi-property
right to acknowledge the interests of surviving relatives to control the decedent’s remains
but does not constitute “property” as defined in the constitutional sense); Sanford v. Ware,
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other words, family members retain a “quasi-property right” to
determine the fate of the deceased’s remains.51
Although courts recognize the limited quasi-property right to
possess the corpse for burial purposes, they have rejected any claim that
a consent form constitutes a contract.52 For instance, in Perry v. Saint
Francis Hospital and Medical Center, Inc., a nurse assured the decedent’s
family that doctors would only remove his corneas and bone marrow;
but, in fact, the hospital removed the deceased’s eyes and major bones as
well.53 In discussing the hospital’s pending motion for summary
judgment, the U.S. district court sustained the family’s claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress but rejected its breach of
contract claim with regard to the donation consent form.54 The court
60 S.E.2d 10, 12 (Va. 1950) (“Although there is no right of property in a commercial sense in
the dead body of a human being, the right to bury and preserve the remains is recognized
and protected as a quasi-property right.”). But see State v. Powell, 497 So. 2d 1188, 1191–92
(Fla. 1986) (finding that the removal of the decedent’s corneas without consent did not
violate the state constitution because a person’s protected rights under the constitution end
upon death and the next-of-kin maintains no property right in the decedent’s remains).
51
See Newman, 287 F.3d at 797 n.13 (“There is no entry for ‘quasi property’ in Blacks [sic]
Law Dictionary (6th Ed.1990) or Ballentine's Law Dictionary (3d ed.1969), although each
contains entries for ‘quasi contract.’”).
52
See Perry v. Saint Francis Hosp. & Med. Ctr., Inc., 886 F. Supp. 1551, 1563 (D. Kan.
1995) (stating that Kansas common law is identical to the position universally held by other
jurisdictions, in that there is no property right in a corpse itself but only the right of
possession to dispose of the corpse); Hearon v. City of Chicago, 510 N.E.2d 1192, 1195 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1987) (recognizing that the right to possess the deceased’s body vests in the nextof-kin for them to make appropriate disposition decisions); Dougherty, 387 A.2d at 246 n.2
(identifying the universal consensus that there is no property right to a corpse in either a
commercial or material sense); Strachan v. John F. Kennedy Mem’l Hosp., 538 A.2d 346, 350
(N.J. 1988) (explaining that the state has recognized a quasi-property right in the body of
the deceased for more than fifty years).
53
886 F. Supp. at 1551. On January 28, 1992, Kenneth Perry suffered a heart attack while
at his home and paramedics transported him to St. Francis Hospital. Id. at 1555. The
hospital was unable to resuscitate Perry and he died shortly after his arrival at St. Francis.
Id. Following his death, a nurse approached the family and discussed donating Perry’s
body for research or potentially donating his tissue. Id. The nurse recognized that organ
donation was not possible because of the manner in which Perry died. Id. The family
originally declined to donate any of Perry’s body but later consented to donating his
corneas because the nurse explained that the procedure only involved peeling the corneas
off of his eye. Id. The nurse then questioned the family about donating bone marrow,
which again the family initially rejected and only later consented to after the nurse
explained the process could be done with a needle and syringe. Id. The widow later
learned that the hospital removed the large major bones from Perry’s “upper arm, hip and
leg regions” and, after litigation commenced, also discovered that the hospital removed
Perry’s corneas as well as his entire eyes. Id. at 1553, 1556.
54
Id. at 1561, 1563. The court believed that the nurse lied numerous times about the
limited surgical procedures and the consequences of signing the consent form. Id. at 1562.
Such deception resulted in mutilation to Perry’s remains and caused the family to donate
more than they believed Perry would have wanted donated. Id. Thus, the court sustained
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identified that resorting to contract law was irreconcilable with society’s
beliefs and values concerning organ donation.55
2.

Property Rights (or a Lack Thereof) in the Living Body

Historically, under certain circumstances, courts considered the
living human body property, although the recognition of a property
right did not grant an individual absolute control over his own body.56
the decision that St. Francis was not entitled to summary judgment on the intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim. Id. The court also held that the widow’s property
right in the deceased’s body did not include a right to convey the body for consideration.
Id. at 1563. Instead, under Kansas law, the widow maintained a quasi-property right in the
body, comprised of the right to possess it for the purposes of burial and preservation. Id.
Therefore, the court denied that the consent form constituted a contract. Id.
55
Id. The court cited State v. Powell for the proposition “‘that laws regarding the
removal of human tissues for transplantation implicate moral, ethical, theological,
philosophical, and economic concerns which do not readily lend themselves to analysis
within a traditional legal framework.’” Id. at 1563 n.7 (quoting Powell, 497 So. 2d at 1194).
Instead, the court identified the appropriate approach was to look at statutes written on
organ and tissue donation. Id. For instance, in Moore v. Regents of the University of
California, the California Supreme Court supported looking to the specialized statutes
governing human biological materials as objects rather than abandoning the statutes and
considering the general law of personal property. Id. The district court concluded that
“[t]he same could be said for resorting strictly to contract law when there is an alleged
agreement for the transfer of human remains.” Id.
56
See Gorsline & Johnson, supra note 44, at 11 (stating that historically, under various
circumstances, property rights existed in the living body). Gorsline and Johnson note that
under the common law:
[A] creditor could force payment of a debt by personally attaching the
debtor and placing the debtor in prison. Furthermore, a woman’s
body was considered the property of her husband. Finally, during a
dark period in our nation’s history, we recognized the ownership of
living human beings under the institution of slavery.
Id. (footnotes omitted). For a discussion of property rights associated with a decedent’s
body, see Newman, 287 F.3d at 796, where the court held that California infringed on the
dignity of the deceased children by extracting their corneas without the consent of the
parents. Other courts have similarly held that the next-of-kin retains a limited quasiproperty right to the deceased. See, e.g., Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 481 (6th Cir.
1991) (recognizing that the prevailing view of courts is that the next-of-kin maintains a
quasi-property right for burial or other purposes); Cohen v. Groman Mortuary, Inc., 41 Cal.
Rptr. 481, 483 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (identifying that a quasi-property right to the corpse for
burial purposes existed); Keyes v. Kenkel, 78 N.W. 649, 649 (Mich. 1899) (holding that the
action against funeral directors seeking replevin of a human corpse could not succeed);
Sanford v. Ware, 60 S.E.2d 10, 12 (Va. 1950) (“Although there is no right of property in a
commercial sense in the dead body of a human being, the right to bury and preserve the
remains is recognized and protected as a quasi-property right.”). But see Regina v. Sharpe,
(1857) 169 Eng. Rep. 959 (Crim. App.) 960; Dears. & Bell 159, 163 (describing that there are
no property rights to a corpse); Brian G. Hannemann, Note, Body Parts and Property Rights:
A New Commodity for the 1990s, 22 SW. U.L. REV. 399, 404 (1993) (“[O]ver three hundred
years of common law failed to recognize a property right in the human body.”).
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Courts today are reluctant to identify a property right associated with
the human body during life, and instead, certain jurisdictions recognize
that a person maintains a privacy interest in his living body.57
For instance, in McFall v. Shimp, a Pennsylvania court considered
whether society maintained the right to infringe upon one’s human body
in order to protect the life of another.58 Robert McFall (“McFall”)
suffered from a rare bone marrow disease, and without a bone marrow
transplant, he faced imminent death.59 McFall’s cousin, David Shimp
(“Shimp”), was a bone marrow match, and McFall petitioned the court to
issue an injunction requiring Shimp to donate his bone marrow.60 The
court denied McFall’s injunction, recognizing that under the common
law “one human being is under no legal compulsion to give aid or to
take action to save another human being or to rescue.”61
A similar situation arose in Curran v. Bosze, a case in which a father
sought an injunction mandating that a mother allow doctors to perform
blood tests on her twin children.62 The father’s son, who was the twin
children’s half-brother, faced impending death unless the family was
able to secure a bone marrow transplant.63 Similar to the court in McFall,
the Curran court denied the injunction.64
One of the most widely recognized cases rejecting a living person’s
property interest in human tissue is Moore v. Regents of the University of

57
See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 480 (Cal. 1990) (rejecting the
claim for conversion brought by the plaintiff and discussing a living person’s respective
right to privacy in his body). See generally Susan L. Crockin, Statutory and Case Law
Governing Oocyte and Embryo Donation, in PRINCIPLES OF OOCYTE AND EMBRYO DONATION at
241 (Mark V. Sauer ed., 2d ed. 1998) (discussing the current state of the law that governs
female egg donation).
58
See 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90, 90–91 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1978) (addressing the issue of whether a
person has an interest in infringing on the body of another).
59
Id. at 90.
60
Id.; see A Cousin’s Stunning Refusal to Donate Bone Marrow Leaves Robert McFall Facing
Death, PEOPLE, Aug. 14, 1978, at 52, available at http://www.people.com/people/archive/
article/0,,20071484,00.html (elaborating on the familial tension between the McFall and
Shimp families and suggesting that the cousins may have in fact been half-brothers, which
is why, as cousins, McFall and Shimp were a bone marrow match).
61
McFall, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d at 91–92; see A Cousin’s Stunning Refusal to Donate Bone
Marrow Leaves Robert McFall Facing Death, supra note 60 (quoting the judge as describing
Shimp’s position as “morally indefensible”).
62
See Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319, 1321 (Ill. 1990) (identifying a father’s request for
an injunction that would have mandated a mother to allow doctors to perform blood tests
on their twin children).
63
See id. (pointing out that the half-brother needed a life-saving bone marrow
transplant).
64
See id. at 1345 (denying the father’s request for an injunction).
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California.65 In Moore, John Moore (“Moore”) obtained medical treatment
from the UCLA Medical Center after doctors diagnosed him with hairycell leukemia.66 For seven years, Moore periodically visited the medical
center, and during each visit Dr. Golde removed samples of Moore’s
blood, sperm, bone marrow, and skin.67 In actuality, Dr. Golde was
removing Moore’s tissues and selling them to a researcher for
commercial development.68 After discovering Dr. Golde’s transactions,
Moore sued for conversion of property, among other things.69
The California Supreme Court recognized that Dr. Golde failed to
meet the full disclosure requirements under state law.70 Acknowledging
that Moore did not give informed consent, the court found that Moore’s
cause of action could proceed under his breach of a fiduciary duty

793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990). See generally Joseph Shapiro & Sandra Bartlett, All Things
Considered: Calculating the Value of Human Tissue Donation, NPR (July 17, 2012),
http://www.npr.org/2012/07/17/156876476/calculating-the-value-of-human-tissuedonation (providing a personal account of the tissue donation process, compared to organ
donation). One gentleman who works with tissue donations at an organ bank in Madison,
Wisconsin recognized that “[t]issue donation was totally different, and I knew it going into
it . . . . We’re recovering skin, bones, tendons, heart valves, veins, those sorts of things.” Id.
Essentially, tissue encompasses the parts of the human body that are not living organs. Id.
66
Moore, 793 P.2d at 480. Dr. David W. Golde confirmed Moore’s diagnosis of leukemia
and recommended that Moore undergo surgery to have his spleen removed. Id. at 481.
Moore followed Dr. Golde’s advice and consented to the surgery. Id.
67
Id. Moore gave his consent to the removal of these samples, after Dr. Golde told him
that the samples and removal of his spleen were pertinent to his health. Id.
68
Id. Dr. Golde recognized that Moore’s blood was unique in composition and that his
blood contained competitive, commercial advantages. Id. at 482. Eventually Dr. Golde
utilized Moore’s cells in the creation of a patented cell line, which listed Dr. Golde as the
inventor. Id. at 481–82.
69
See id. at 482 n.4. (identifying Moore’s thirteen original claims asserted against Dr.
Golde: “(1) [c]onversion; (2) lack of informed consent; (3) breach of fiduciary duty; (4)
fraud and deceit; (5) unjust enrichment; (6) quasi-contract; (7) bad faith breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (8) intentional infliction of emotional
distress; (9) negligent misrepresentation; (10) intentional interference with prospective
advantageous economic relationships; (11) slander of title; (12) accounting; and (13)
declaratory relief” (internal quotation marks omitted)). At the start of the action, the trial
court determined that twelve of the additional claims merged into the conversion claim. Id.
at 482. Thus, the trial court only considered the conversion claim, which it ultimately
denied. Id.; see Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 249 Cal. Rptr. 494, 502 (Ct. App. 1988)
(remanding the case with instructions that the trial court should rule on the conversion
claim along with the other twelve causes of action it failed to originally consider). On
appeal, the California Court of Appeals found that Moore’s claim stated a valid cause of
action for conversion. Id.
70
See Moore, 793 P.2d at 484 (recognizing that a physician can solve a conflict of interest
with his patients by ensuring that there is prior disclosure). In its decision, the court relied
on legislation concerning a physician’s commercial investment in clinical laboratories. Id.
at 483–84.
65
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claim.71 However, the court denied Moore’s conversion claim and
explained that Moore did not retain an ownership interest in the
patented cell line.72 In pertinent part, the court found that Moore had no
claim to the patented cells because they were legally and factually
different from Moore’s own cells.73 The California Supreme Court
declined to expand the law of conversion to these circumstances because
the court believed that Moore’s breach of fiduciary duty and informed
consent claims adequately protected his interests.74
In addition, within the last ten years, additional cases addressing
tissues and cells as intellectual property have emerged.75 In Greenberg v.
Miami Children’s Hospital Research Institute, Inc., both parties sought to
detect and cure a genetic disorder called Canavan disease.76 Plaintiffs
provided blood, urine, and autopsy samples, along with confidential
information, believing that doctors would use the samples for research to

71
See id. at 483 (recognizing that Dr. Golde’s research interests may have conflicted with
the medical procedures performed on Moore, and as such, Moore’s claim could properly
proceed as breach of a fiduciary duty because Dr. Golde failed to disclose and receive
Moore’s informed consent to perform the research and tests).
72
See id. at 489 (identifying three reasons to doubt that Moore intended to maintain an
ownership interest in his donated cells). See generally E. RICHARD GOLD, BODY PARTS:
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS 26–27 (1996)
(contending that the court failed to recognize a property interest in Moore’s tissues because
it feared that doing so would hinder the exchange of human biological material and thus
harm the development of pharmaceutical products). First, the court found that there was
no case law acknowledging that a person retains an interest in excised cells so as to bring a
claim for conversion. Moore, 793 P.2d at 489. Second, the court reasoned that California
statutory law drastically limited a person’s control over excised cells. Id. at 491. Finally,
and most importantly, the court found that the patented cells could not constitute Moore’s
property because “the patented cell line is both factually and legally distinct from the cells
taken from Moore’s body.” Id. at 492.
73
Moore, 793 P.2d at 492; see Denise Spellman, Note, Encouragement Is Not Enough: The
Benefits of Instituting a Mandated Choice Organ Procurement System, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 353,
358 (explaining the Moore decision and the court’s refusal to recognize an ownership
interest); see also Andrew W. Torrance, DNA Copyright, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 7 (2011)
(discussing the aptness of DNA patent protection).
74
See Moore, 793 P.2d at 489 (stating that the court balanced policy considerations
against the decision to expand the underlying principles of property law); see also Spellman,
supra note 73, at 359 (identifying that the court believed informed consent and fiduciary
duty adequately protected Moore’s claim).
75
See, e.g., Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d
1064, 1066 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (discussing a research team that isolated the gene responsible for
Canavan disease, and recognizing that after patenting the gene, individuals who provided
samples, confidential information, and sources for the research sued the team).
76
See id. (identifying that Greenberg approached Dr. Matalon of the University of
Illinois at Chicago for assistance in determining what genes were responsible for the fatal
Canavan disease).
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identify mutations that could help detect carriers of the disease.77 After
defendants had a breakthrough and isolated the gene responsible for
Canavan disease, they sought and obtained a patent on the research.78
Although the plaintiffs’ complaint identified six counts, the court held
that only the unjust enrichment claim should survive the motion to
dismiss.79 The court rejected the plaintiffs’ claim for conversion,
analogizing the facts in Greenberg to the facts in Moore.80
Thus, the current precedent rejects any claim that a living person
possesses an absolute property right in his living body or its subparts.81
On the other hand, there are certain tissues and fluids—including blood,
hair, ova, and semen—which persons maintain the right to trade or sell
under current legislation and precedent.82

77
Id. at 1067. Plaintiff Greenberg assisted in locating other Canavan families and urged
them to donate blood and tissue samples to help further the research. Id. Greenberg was
also responsible for creating a confidential database that contained information about the
families. Id. The plaintiffs provided Dr. Matalon with the samples and information
believing the research was to discover mutations and benefit the population at large. Id.
78
Id. In 1993, Dr. Matalon and his research team had a breakthrough after successfully
isolating the mutated gene. Id. This was due in part to the samples of blood and tissue
provided by the plaintiffs, along with the familial pedigree information, other contacts, and
financial support. Id. Plaintiffs claimed that they continued to provide tissue and blood
samples to Dr. Matalon so the research team could discover more about the disease and the
mutated gene. Id. Then, in September 1994, without the plaintiffs’ knowledge, the
defendants submitted a patent application for the genetic sequence. Id.
79
See id. at 1073 (denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss concerning the unjust
enrichment claim).
80
See id. at 1074–75 (quoting the California Supreme Court in Moore, stating “[n]o court
has ever in a reported decision imposed conversion liability for the use of human cells in
medical research”). The court agreed with the California Supreme Court in Moore that the
patented cell line was factually and legally distinct from the samples originally taken. Id.
The court also pointed to State v. Powell and agreed that property rights associated with
body tissues evaporated after individuals voluntarily provided the samples to a third
party. Id. at 1075.
81
See supra notes 58–80 and accompanying text (illustrating the lack of an absolute
property right in the living human body).
82
See Gorsline & Johnson, supra note 44, at 11 n.61 (recognizing that blood is widely
purchased and sold; however, “urine, skin, sweat, saliva, semen, and pituitary glands also
are traded in exchange for money”). In fact, “[b]etween 1965 and 1967, 80% of the blood
collected in the United States came from donors who were paid or rewarded in some way,
while only 7% came from voluntary nonpaid donors.” Id. at 11–12 n.61. These body tissues
maintain various rights that are associated with property. Id. at 11–12. However, courts
are split on whether the sale of blood constitutes the sale of a product or service. Id. at 12.
This is critical in understanding whether a court can find the hospital or blood bank
responsible for supplying the blood liable for any defects in the blood under a theory of
strict products liability. Id. On the other hand, if the court deems the sale of blood is a
service, then the hospital would not be liable for any deficiencies with the blood. Id.
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B. Organ Donation Legislation
Political and social circumstances played an important role in
shaping the organ donation process and procedure.83 This Part considers
the legislature’s approach to organ donation by discussing the model
codes and statutes that oversee the organ donation process.84 Part II.B.1
reviews the 1968 UAGA and briefly discusses the revisions to the UAGA
implemented in 1987 and 2006.85 Then, Part II.B.2 addresses NOTA, a
federal law that expressly prohibits the sale of human organs.86
Understanding the prohibition in NOTA first requires a brief
consideration of the UAGA and its revisions since 1968.87
1.

The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act

Following World War II, the need for human tissues and organs
increased drastically.88 The enlarged demand coupled with the exhibited
willingness of individuals to donate caused some states to enact organ
Although
donation legislation during the 1950s and 1960s.89
commentators considered these state statutes a large improvement from
the common law approach, which placed no restrictions on organ
See infra Parts II.B.1–2 (discussing various social circumstances that influenced the
changes in the model codes and legislation).
84
See infra Parts II.B.1–2 (describing the UAGA, the revisions made to the UAGA, and
the only piece of federal legislation that governs the sale of human organs, NOTA).
85
See infra Part II.B.1 (examining the UAGA provisions and the 1987 and 2006 revisions).
86
See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing the enactment of NOTA in 1984).
87
See infra Part II.B.1 (considering the UAGA and its subsequent revisions in 1987 and
2006).
88
See Crespi, supra note 2, at 11 (identifying that as the medical community continued to
break ground in the science of organ transplantation after World War II there was an
increase in the demand of organs used for medical research, education and therapeutic
purposes, and someday for transplantation); see also Abena Richards, Comment, Don’t Take
Your Organs to Heaven . . . Heaven Knows We Need Them Here: Another Look at the Required
Response System, 26 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 365, 370 (2006) (explaining that people initially
donated organs for medical reasons). According to one source, the first successful
transplantation involved skin and corneas. Id. Then, in 1954, “the first successful invasive
procedure occurred . . . when Dr. Joseph E. Murray was able to remove a kidney from one
identical twin and transplant it to the other.” Id. at 370–71.
89
See Crespi, supra note 2, at 12 (stating that California initiated the movement toward
enacting organ donation legislation in 1947, and other states followed throughout the 1950s
and early 1960s); see also Richards, supra note 88, at 371 (explaining that by 1968 forty-two
states had introduced legislation that would allow for individuals to donate their organs
after death). The state legislation granted individuals or their surviving kin the right to
make an anatomical gift for a variety of medical purposes, including transplantation.
Crespi, supra note 2, at 12. Some of the early legislation also allowed for restricted
commerce in human organs, even though evidence of commercial transactions occurring
had not materialized. Id.
83
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procurement, the state-enacted legislation contained unmanageable
standards.90 Many states enacted deficiently drafted statutes and issues
arose regarding the disparate approaches to organ donation from state to
state.91 As the number of transferrable organs continued to decline and
the advancement in transplant techniques began to thrive, the
shortcomings of state donation laws came to the forefront.92 Finally, in
1965, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(“National Conference of Commissioners”) established a subcommittee
to commence in drafting a model act that would provide uniformity for
state legislation addressing organ donation.93
In 1968, the National Conference of Commissioners approved the
UAGA.94 The central purpose of the UAGA was to develop a model
code that would promote consistency among state statutes and provide a
method for states to tackle the organ shortage.95 By 1973, all fifty states,
along with the District of Columbia, adopted the UAGA.96 The UAGA
See Crespi, supra note 2, at 12 (pointing out that the statutes were a marked
improvement in the common law understanding of property rights in bodily organs).
91
See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT prefatory note (1968) (discussing issues with state
statutes regarding organ donation).
The Commission begins by identifying the
shortcomings of state statutes, in that they differ both as to coverage and content. Id.
[The state laws] differ in their enumeration of permissible donees
(some require specified donees, others permit gifts to any hospital or
physician in charge at death); they differ as to acceptable purpose of
gifts (some, for example, do not include licensed tissue banks); some
differ as to the minimum age of the donor; others as to the manner of
execution of gifts and the manner of revocation. Some require delivery
of the instrument of gift or filing in a public office, or both, as a
condition of validity. Others make no such provision.
Id. These differences were understood to create legal problems for doctors who would rely
upon the donation laws of the state where they performed the transplant but then would
be in violation of organ donation laws in another state. Id.
92
See Crespi, supra note 2, at 12 (acknowledging that the medical field made great strides
during the 1960s regarding transplant technology, and yet the shortage of transplantable
organs continued to persist). This dilemma directed focus to the state-enacted legislation
and the shortcomings of those statutes. Id.
93
See id. (“In 1965 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law
appointed a subcommittee to draft a model act that would encourage the donation and use
of cadaveric organs.”); Richards, supra note 88, at 371 (discussing that the lack of uniformity
among the states prompted the National Conference of Commissioners to introduce the
UAGA).
94
See Crespi, supra note 2, at 12 (identifying that the National Conference of
Commissioners approved the model act in 1968 and even received the endorsement of the
American Bar Association).
95
See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT prefatory note (1968) (proposing that the adoption of
the UAGA would provide for a uniform legal environment as the nation approached the
“new frontier of modern medicine”).
96
See Dunham, supra note 1 (stating that by 1973 all fifty states, along with the District of
Columbia, had enacted the UAGA); see also Richards, supra note 88, at 372 (“[T]oday only
90
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addressed an individual’s right to execute an anatomical gift, which is
“[a] testamentary donation of a bodily organ or organs, esp[ecially] for
transplant or for medical research.”97 The UAGA helped shape the
formation of the U.S. organ donation system.98
However, after further advancement in transplant procedures, the
National Conference of Commissioners reconvened in 1985 to revise the
UAGA.99 During this process, they focused on emphasizing donation for
transplantation, as opposed to donation for research or education.100 The
National Conference of Commissioners also concentrated on simplifying
and improving the process of making an anatomical gift.101 In some
thirty states have gift laws derived from the 1968 UAGA. Some states have made only
slight modifications to the UAGA, thereby allowing the UAGA to continue to achieve one
of its primary goals—establishing uniformity in organ donation laws.” (footnotes
omitted)).
97
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 757 (9th ed. 2009).
98
See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1968) (setting forth three important provisions that
helped to shape the formation of the United States organ donation system). First, the
individual maintained the right to determine whether to execute an anatomical gift. Id.
§ 2(a). The UAGA provided alternative methods to establish a person’s postmortem
wishes in writing, including gift by will, or by a document other than a will and in the
presence of two witnesses. Id. § 4(a)–(b). In addition, an individual could make a gift by
identifying a specific donee or without identifying a specific donee. Id. § 4(c). The donor
also had the power to establish, within the document, the surgeon or physician to carry out
the transplant procedure. Id. § 4(d). In situations where the donor did not specify a
physician, the donee or other party accepting the gift retained the power to authorize any
physician to perform the procedure. Id. Second, the UAGA identified that the decedent’s
postmortem wishes regarding anatomical gifts were paramount to the wishes of others. Id.
§ 2(e). Only in situations where the decedent failed to identify his desire to donate prior to
death did the decedent’s family members retain the power to choose whether to donate any
or all of the decedent’s bodily organs. Id. § 2(b). Third, due to the civil and criminal
liability associated with procuring organs, the UAGA provided that courts would not hold
individuals liable so long as they acted in “good faith” and in compliance with the UAGA
provisions. Id. § 7(c). Regardless, some physicians and hospitals refused to perform organ
donation procedures unless they secured the consent of the decedent’s family. See Gorsline
& Johnson, supra note 44, at 15–16 (stating that despite the UAGA’s language that persons
in good faith will avoid liability, doctors, medical facilities, and Organ Procurement
Organizations generally rejected the anatomical gifts unless they were able to secure
consent from the decedent’s family).
99
See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT prefatory note (1987) (identifying that the issue of
organ transplantation sat idle for many years, but with the advancement in transplant
procedures—including the creation of new immunosuppressive drugs, like Cyclosporine—
the transplantation process “was brought back into the center stage of public policy
concern”). The 1968 UAGA proved to be ineffective in generating a greater supply of
organs to match the demand. Id.
100
See id. § 6 cmt. (recognizing that the 1987 UAGA reversed the sequence of purposes
for which an individual may make an anatomical gift to emphasize transplantation as the
primary purpose).
101
See id. at prefatory note (specifying the proposed amendments would simplify the
procedure for making an anatomical gift and allow for the donor’s intentions to prevail).
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respects they were successful.102 In addition, they added a provision in
the 1987 amendments that prohibited the sale of organs.103 This
limitation “[did] not include reasonable payment for the removal,
processing,
disposal,
preservation,
quality
control,
storage,
104
transportation, or implantation of a part.”
In 2006, the National Conference of Commissioners again revised the
UAGA to more accurately reflect the current system of organ
transplantation.105 In order to make the process of donating more
manageable, the newly amended UAGA included a provision that
allows for the donor’s driver’s license to indicate his donative intent.106
These amendments also strengthened the donor’s consent and prevented

See id. § 2 cmt. (stating that the revisions deleted the requirement of two witnesses’
signatures to simplify the gifting of anatomical parts). Other revisions attempted to ensure
that the donor’s intent received priority because previously, under the 1968 UAGA,
circumstances arose in which the family’s donative intent preempted the decedent’s intent.
See, e.g., id. § 2(h) (“An anatomical gift that is not revoked by the donor before death is
irrevocable.”). This was important because few organ transplant centers were inclined to
procure organs based solely on the decedent’s organ donor card or driver’s license consent.
Id. § 2 cmt. Rather, if the transplant centers were unable to locate the decedent’s family
members, less than twenty-five percent procured the organ despite the donor’s written
consent. Id. The amendments also resolved any confusion regarding carrying a specific
organ donor card (i.e. a kidney donation card). Id. This alteration attempted to ensure that
the type of organ donor card did not restrict anatomical gifts to that type of organ only. Id.
103
See id. § 10 (prohibiting the sale or purchase of a part); see also Gorsline & Johnson,
supra note 44, at 10 (explaining that the 1987 UAGA limited a person’s power to control the
disposition of his remains by prohibiting the sale or purchase of body parts). Section 10(a)
states in relevant part: “[a] person may not knowingly, for valuable consideration,
purchase or sell a part for transplantation or therapy, if removal of the part is intended to
occur after the death of the decedent.” UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 10(2) (1987); see id.
§ 1(7) (defining “part” as “an organ, tissue, eye, bone, artery, blood, fluid, or other portion
of a human body”).
104
UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 10(b) (1987). The prohibition is not limited only to
donors but applies to any individual seeking to engage in the sale or purchase of an organ.
Id. § 10 cmt. However, the prohibition does not include the sale of organs from living
donors provided that the donation occurs prior to the donor’s death. Id.
105
See Legislative Fact Sheet—Anatomical Gift Act (2006), UNIFORM L. COMMISSION,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Anatomical%20Gift%20Act
%20(2006) (last visited Aug. 15, 2013) (identifying that the 2006 UAGA revises the former
versions in light of the changes in federal regulations and law, and other developments in
the science of organ donation).
106
See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 5(a)(1) (2006) (amended 2008) (entitling a donor to
make an anatomical gift by authorizing a statement or symbol on the donor’s driver’s
license or identification card that indicates the intent to donate); see also U.S. Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs., State Organ Donation Legislation, ORGANDONOR.GOV
http://www.organdonor.gov/legislation_micro/index.html#tableTitle (last visited Jan. 1,
2013) (identifying that all fifty states approved a designation on a person’s driver’s license
denoting their status as an organ donor).
102
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others from amending or revoking the donor’s consent.107 Thus far,
forty-five states, along with the U.S. Virgin Islands and the District of
Columbia, have enacted some version of the 2006 Revised UAGA.108
2.

The National Organ Transplant Act of 1984

During the 1980s, after the enactment of the original UAGA,
Congress directed its attention to the nationwide organ shortage and
enacted NOTA.109 When Congress passed NOTA the United States
suffered from a shortage of organs available for transplantation.110
107
See Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, Why States Should Adopt UAGA,
UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx?title=Why%20
States%20Should%20Adopt%20UAGA (last visited Sept. 20, 2012) (identifying numerous
reasons why states should adopt the updated 2006 UAGA, which substantially
strengthened first person consent under the revisions); see also UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT
§ 9 (2006) (amended 2008) (providing an updated list of those classes of persons that may
make an anatomical gift of a decedent’s body). The 2006 UAGA updated the current list of
parties who may make anatomical gifts of a decedent’s body in the following order of
priority:
(1) an agent of the decedent at the time of death who could have
made an anatomical gift under Section 4(2) immediately before
the decedent’s death;
(2) the spouse of the decedent;
(3) adult children of the decedent;
(4) parents of the decedent;
(5) adult siblings of the decedent;
(6) adult grandchildren of the decedent;
(7) grandparents of the decedent;
(8) an adult who exhibited special care and concern for the decedent;
(9) the persons who were acting as the [guardians] of the person of
the decedent at the time of death; and
(10) any other person having the authority to dispose of the
decedent’s body.
Id.
108
Legislative Fact Sheet—Anatomical Gift Act (2006), supra note 105. According to the
legislative fact sheet, the following jurisdictions have enacted the 2006 UAGA: “Alabama,
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia,
Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, U.S.
Virgin Islands, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, [and]
Wyoming.” Id. Additionally, the Pennsylvania and Illinois legislatures introduced the
2006 UAGA in 2013. Id.
109
See Sarah Elizabeth Statz, Note, Finding the Winning Combination: How Blending Organ
Procurement Systems Used Internationally Can Reduce the Organ Shortage, 39 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 1677, 1685 (2006) (pointing out that the 1968 UAGA failed to increase the
supply of organs as much as expected).
110
See S. REP. NO. 98-382, at 2 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3975, 3976
(identifying that, at the time Congress passed NOTA, an average of 20,000 people died
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Congress’s motivation to act quickly was due in part to its fear that a
market system for organs would soon develop.111
Led by Congressman Al Gore, Congress enacted NOTA to protect
the altruistic nature of organ donation and implement a more effective
system for organizing and encouraging organ donation.112 While
Congress was proposing a system for organ procurement, Dr. Barry
Jacobs testified at a congressional subcommittee hearing and explained
in detail his theory of developing an “organs-for-sale” system to organ
procurement.113 Congress thereafter inserted a provision into Gore’s
draft bill that banned payment for organs.114 The inserted provision
received almost unanimous approval.115
NOTA’s primary purpose was to establish a national organ
procurement system known as the Organ Procurement and
Prior to the creation of the Organ
Transplantation Network.116
Procurement and Transplantation Network, some private individuals
publicly campaigned in an attempt to obtain an organ match for their

annually under conditions that would permit for hospitals to use their organs in
transplantation, yet less than 15% of those individuals underwent organ procurement).
111
See Steve P. Calandrillo, Cash for Kidneys? Utilizing Incentives to End America’s Organ
Shortage, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 69, 79 (2004) (identifying that the organ brokerage
proposed by Doctor Barry Jacobs, which suggested selling and purchasing organs, did not
receive wide support from the National Kidney Foundation or American politicians).
112
See id. at 79–80 (pointing out that the motivation behind NOTA was both to preserve
the “gift” aspect of organ donation and provide for an organized donation system).
113
See Sally L. Satel & Benjamin E. Hippen, When Altruism Is Not Enough: The Worsening
Organ Shortage and What It Means for the Elderly, 15 ELDER L.J. 153, 188 (2007) (explaining Dr.
Jacob’s theory behind an organ procurement system that operated under a market
approach). See generally Robyn S. Shapiro, Legal Issues in Payment of Living Donors for Solid
Organs, HUM. RTS. MAG., Spring 2003, at 19, 20 (explaining that each year between 200 and
300 Americans purchase organs from individuals in third world countries).
114
See Satel & Hippen, supra note 113, at 188 (identifying Congress’s fear of Dr. Jacob’s
scheme and Congress’s refusal to acknowledge that a market approach could work).
Congress promulgated the provision against the sale of organs after Dr. Barry Jacobs, a
Virginia physician, attempted to institute an organ brokerage called the International
Kidney Exchange. Id. Dr. Jacobs planned to sell organs, specifically kidneys, to individuals
seeking to avoid further dialysis, after marking up the pricing of the kidney anywhere from
$2000 to $5000 dollars. Id. Dr. Jacobs testified at a congressional subcommittee hearing
entitled “Procurement and Allocation of Human Organs for Transplantation” and
presented his theory of implementing an “organs-for-sale” system. Id. Congress not only
refused to entertain Dr. Jacobs’s scheme, but Congress thereafter took action to implement
a prohibition against the sale of organs. Id. Congressman Al Gore quickly inserted a
provision in his draft bill that banned payment for organs. Id.
115
See id. (explaining that the provision banning the sale of human organs received
widespread support throughout Congress).
116
See generally 42 U.S.C. § 274 (2006), which addresses the Organ Procurement and
Transplantation Network.
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loved ones.117 However, following the enactment of NOTA, the Organ
Procurement and Transplantation Network created a national list of
individuals seeking organs and assisted in developing systems for
procuring and allocating available organs.118 This provided a more
cohesive framework for individuals to obtain transplantable organs.119
In addition to providing a more effective means of procuring organs,
NOTA banned the sale of organs from both living and deceased
donors.120 Specifically, NOTA made it “unlawful for any person to
knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human organ for
valuable consideration for use in human transplantation.”121
The
117
Satel & Hippen, supra note 113, at 185. Charles Fisk gained widespread attention in
his search to find an organ for his baby girl. Id. His daughter, Jamie, was dying of biliary
atresia, where “bile ducts that normally discharge metabolic waste products do not
develop” and the toxins endure within the liver, eventually destroying it. Id. During
October of 1982, Fisk pleaded with the American Academy of Pediatricians at their annual
meeting. Id. Time Magazine recognized his campaign as “a remarkably skillful publicity
campaign,” which proved to pay off when the son of a Utah couple died in a car accident
and the family donated the boy’s liver to eleven-month-old Jamie. Id.
118
42 U.S.C. § 274(a), (b)(2). The difference between an organ procurement system and
an organ allocation system is critical. Organ procurement pertains to the acquiring of
transplantable organs; whereas, organ allocation involves distributing the transplantable
organs to donees.
See About Organ Allocation, TRANSPLANT LIVING,
http://www.transplantliving.org/before-the-transplant/about-organ-allocation/
(last
visited Aug. 18, 2013) (providing links that discuss the matching, waiting, and allocation
process and policies); see also Satel & Hippen, supra note 113, at 184 (describing that, prior
to NOTA, some medical facilities would establish their own system of matching, which did
not prove effective for patients who did not reside within that geographic area).
119
See 42 U.S.C. § 273(b)(3)(C) (identifying that Congress designed the Organ
Procurement and Transplantation Network to alleviate the previous problems associated
with organ procurement); see also U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., About OPTN,
ORGAN PROCUREMENT & TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, http://optn.transplant.hrsa.
gov/optn/profile.asp (last visited Aug. 13, 2013) (explaining the purpose of the Organ
Procurement and Transplantation Network).
120
See 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (“It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly acquire,
receive, or otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable consideration for use in
human transplantation if the transfer affects interstate commerce.”); Satel & Hippen, supra
note 113, at 188 (explaining that the major goal behind NOTA was coordination of
distribution systems).
121
42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (emphasis added); see id. § 274e(c)(2) (stating “‘valuable
consideration’ does not include the reasonable payments associated with the removal,
transportation, implantation, processing, preservation, quality control, and storage of a
human organ or the expenses of travel, housing, and lost wages incurred by the donor of a
human organ in connection with the donation of the organ”). See generally DAVID L.
KASERMAN & A.H. BARNETT, THE U.S. ORGAN PROCUREMENT SYSTEM: A PRESCRIPTION FOR
REFORM 76–77 (2002) (arguing that a market system for organ donation will not necessarily
result in exploitation of the poor). For a discussion of the varying views concerning a
market system to organ donation, compare Abdallah S. Daar, Paid Organ Donation: Towards
an Understanding of the Issues, in ORGAN AND TISSUE DONATION FOR TRANSPLANTATION 46,
54 (Jeremy R. Chapman et al. eds., 1997) (explaining that the primary concern in adopting a
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Department of Justice clarified that “valuable consideration” refers to
commercial transactions for the sale of organs and does not prohibit
states from utilizing incentives to increase organ donation.122 The term
organ includes: “kidney, liver, heart, lung, pancreas, bone marrow,
cornea, eye, bone, and skin . . . and any other human organ . . . specified
by the Secretary of Health and Human Services by regulation.”123
Recently, in 2011, the Ninth Circuit limited the term “bone marrow”
found within NOTA’s definition of “human organ” in the case of Flynn v.
Holder.124 The court held that individuals donating bone marrow
through the process of aspiration cannot receive compensation because
the material extracted via aspiration is undoubtedly bone marrow.125
However, individuals who donate bone marrow using the newer
apheresis method, which involves withdrawing the donor’s blood to
market for organ donation is the abuse of such a system), with Lori B. Andrews, My Body,
My Property, 16 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 28, 28 (1986) (identifying that “[a] market in body
parts and products [is needed] . . . to ensure that patients are protected from coercion and
given the chance to be paid fairly for their contributions”).
122
Lisa M. Derco, Note, America’s Organ Donation Crisis: How Current Legislation Must Be
Shaped by Successes Abroad, 27 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 154, 160 (2010). See generally
RUSSELL SCOTT, THE BODY AS PROPERTY 190 (1981) (explaining that individuals regularly
sell human body parts—such as blood, blood products, sperm, and human hair). The
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) stated that “valuable consideration” is limited to
commercial transactions because one of the goals of NOTA was to prevent the sale of
organs. Derco, supra. In addition, NOTA’s legislative history supports that interpretation
and clarifies that Congress designed the provision concerning valuable consideration to
criminalize the sale and purchase of human organs. Id.
123
42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(1); see S. REP. NO. 98-382, at 16–17, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3975, 3982 (distinguishing between the sale and purchase of human organs compared to
blood products, and finding that the blood products are regenerative and fail to pose a
threat to the donor’s health); see also Flynn v. Holder, 684 F.3d 852, 862 (9th Cir. 2012)
(limiting the term bone marrow to include only the soft, fatty marrow obtained through
aspiration and not the marrow cells obtained through apheresis).
124
See 684 F.3d at 862 (holding that the soft, fatty marrow obtained through aspiration is
bone marrow, but that the cells drawn from the veins through apheresis is analogous to
blood and not bone marrow). The court held that NOTA’s ban on compensating bone
marrow donations through aspiration did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Id. In
part, the court reasoned that Congress provided a rational basis for prohibiting
compensation for bone marrow donations extracted through aspiration. Id. The court
identified that Congress feared commodification of one’s bodily tissues and recognized
that society strongly believes in bodily integrity. Id. at 861. The Ninth Circuit recognized
that both policy concerns and philosophical concerns supported the prohibition on
compensation for bone marrow. Id. These concerns included: the fear that the rich may
induce the poor to sell their organs, the fear of organs extracted through fraud or force, or
the fear of degradation of the organ supply by encouraging individuals to lie about their
medical conditions in order to sell their organs. Id. at 860.
125
See id. at 859 (holding the plaintiff’s challenge against the ban on obtaining bone
marrow donations through aspiration failed). Aspiration occurs when “a long needle is
inserted into the cavity of the hip bone to extract the soft, fatty marrow.” Id.
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extract hematopoietic blood stem cells, can receive compensation.126 The
court reasoned that apheresis is similar to blood donation and, because
NOTA’s definition of “human organ” does not include blood, the statute
does not prohibit compensation for apheresis bone marrow donors.127
However, the Ninth Circuit limited the holding in Flynn to the specific
facts of the case, and although the Ninth Circuit created a limited
definition of bone marrow, it upheld the constitutionality of NOTA’s ban
on the sale of human organs.128
Further, anyone convicted of violating NOTA faces up to five years
in prison and a fine of $50,000.129 This punishment has forced states to
give the term “valuable consideration” a broad interpretation.130 The
legislative meaning of valuable consideration was and remains a crucial
area of debate because the term’s interpretation shapes the incentives
states are willing to provide for organ donation.131 Also, although
NOTA prohibits the sale of organs themselves, everything else
associated with the organ donation process comes at a high price for
those in need.132
126
Id. at 862. The court recognized that although the medical field identifies the process
of apheresis as a bone marrow transplant, the cells drawn from the veins include only cells
outside the marrow rather than the soft, fatty marrow. Id. Furthermore, Congress could
not have intended to prohibit the apheresis method when passing NOTA because the
method did not exist at the time. Id. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit concluded that because
Congress omitted blood from the definition of “human organ” under NOTA, Congress did
not intend to prohibit compensation for blood and because apheresis extracted blood cells
only, individuals could receive compensation. Id.
127
See id. at 860, 863 (recognizing that “human organ” does not include blood and
rejecting the argument that the cells obtained from apheresis should be considered a
“subpart thereof” of bone marrow.) The court identified that payment for blood donors
has been common, and the silence within NOTA on compensating blood donors is
indicative of allowing such compensation. Id. at 862.
128
See id. at 865 (stating that the apheresis method of bone marrow transplantation “is
not a transfer of a ‘human organ’ or a ‘subpart thereof’ as defined by [NOTA] . . . so the
statute does not criminalize compensating the donor”).
129
See 42 U.S.C. § 274e(b) (2006) (identifying the fine and prison sentence imposed if a
person violates NOTA).
130
Wait-Listed to Death: Improving Incentives for Organ Donations, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 17,
2008, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB122948107890913051.
The
potential for large fines and imprisonment discourages states from providing incentives to
donors. Id. Congress’s failure to define the term “valuable consideration” forces the states
to determine whether to gamble with their own interpretation of the definition and
potentially face the risk that the definition is incorrect, resulting in the state receiving harsh
punishment. Id.
131
See Derco, supra note 122, at 161 (identifying that the definition of “valuable
consideration” plays a significant role when states determine what incentives they may
legally employ to promote organ donation).
132
See U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Organ Transplantation: The Process,
ORGANDONOR.GOV, http://www.organdonor.gov/about/transplantationprocess.html (last
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C. The Organ Donation Process
The United States’ altruistic model of organ donation is built on
principles of volunteerism.133 Equal access is the hallmark of organ
donation, making certain that whoever is first on the organ donation list
receives the first organ available.134 This means that “[t]he prisoner in
California gets the heart transplant because he needs it and is first on the
list. [The selection process is] blind to whether you’re a saint or a sinner
or a celebrity. [That is] key to maintaining the public trust.”135
Through the enactment of NOTA, Congress established the Organ
Procurement and Transplantation Network to facilitate the organ
donation process.136 The United Network for Organ Sharing (“UNOS”),
a nonprofit, private organization, currently holds the federal government
contract to implement the Organ Procurement and Transplantation
UNOS maintains a centralized computer network
Network.137
responsible for connecting Organ Procurement Organizations with
transplant centers.138 A patient awaiting an organ is placed on a waiting
visited Aug. 15, 2013) (“The average cost of transplantation in 2008 ranged from $259,000
for a single kidney to over $1,200,000 for a heart-lung transplant); Peter S. Young, Moving to
Compensate Families in the Human-Organ Market, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 1994), http://www.ny
times.com/1994/07/08/us/moving-to-compensate-families-in-human-organ-market.html
(recognizing that the medical industry placed a big markup on organ transplantation
services).
133
See U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., supra note 1 (identifying that the United
States’ organ donation system is altruistic); see also Serena Gordon, Risks and Benefits of Egg
Donation
Reported,
U.S.
NEWS
&
WORLD
REP.
(Dec.
26,
2008),
http://health.usnews.com/health-news/family-health/womens-health/articles/2008/12/
26/risks-and-benefits-of-egg-donation-reported (recognizing that various factors
influenced a woman deciding whether to donate her eggs, which included: the feeling of
altruism, obtaining financial compensation, and often times both altruism and financial
compensation).
134
See Satel & Hippen, supra note 113, at 189 (recognizing that the “bedrock principle” of
American organ donation has been equal access).
135
Id. (quoting Mark Fox, the former head of the UNOS ethics committee).
136
See Gorsline & Johnson, supra note 44, at 19 (recognizing that NOTA established the
National Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network); Policy Management National
Organ Transplant Act, ORGAN PROCUREMENT & TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK,
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/policiesAndBylaws/nota.asp (last visited Aug. 15, 2013)
(stating NOTA created the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, which
developed a national registry for organ matching).
137
See About Us, UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING, http://www.unos.org/
about/index.php (last visited Aug. 15, 2013) (identifying that UNOS holds the contract
with the federal government to manage the national organ transplant system).
138
Organ Allocation, UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING, http://www.unos.org/
donation/index.php?topic=organ_allocation (last visited Aug. 15, 2013). UNet was created
so Organ Procurement Organizations and transplant centers could register transplant
patients, match donated organs to potential donees, and readily manage patients’ data. Id.
In 2006, UNOS launched DonorNet, a subpart of Unet, in an attempt to increase the
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list and registered with UNOS, where their personal information,
including name and medical history, is inserted into the computer
network at the UNOS Organ Center.139
The cadaveric donation process is typically set into motion following
an illness or tragic accident.140 After exhausting all possible efforts to
save the patient’s life, the attending physician performs tests to confirm
that the patient is brain dead.141 Thereafter, the hospital contacts an
Organ Procurement Organization and identifies that the potential donor
The Organ Procurement
is nearing death or already dead.142
Organization then searches the registry to determine if the decedent was
registered as a donor.143 In circumstances where the decedent did not
provide consent during life, the Organ Procurement Organization will
reach out to the next-of-kin for consent.144 If either the decedent
efficiency and accuracy of transplantable organ placement. Id. Prior to the establishment
of DonorNet, the transplant community relied upon fax and telephone communication to
exchange information and match organs. Id. However, under DonorNet, electronic
information can be sent out to multiple transplant centers with compatible patients in an
effort to speed up the donation process. Id.
139
See id. (recognizing that the UNet database is responsible for gathering donor
information and running matches between donors and individuals seeking a transplant);
see also Data, supra note 26 (identifying that 119,246 people are awaiting a transplant); U.S.
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., supra note 132 (specifying that the average wait time for a
heart is 113 days, a lung 141 days, an intestine 159 days, a pancreas 260 days, a liver 361
days, and a kidney 1219 days).
140
See U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., supra note 1 (recognizing that often times
donors have suffered severe head trauma, a stroke, or brain aneurysm).
141
See id. (identifying that under most circumstances neurosurgeons or neurologists
perform tests to check for brain death by following commonly accepted medical practices
and state law). The distinguishing characteristic between a coma and brain death is that
brain death is a form of death, whereas a comatose person is are still alive. Id.
142
See id. (identifying that under federal regulations, hospitals notify the local Organ
Procurement Organizations of every patient that is nearing death or has died); see also Sean
T. Gallagher, Note, The Spanish Model’s Capacity to Save Lives by Increasing Organ Donation
Rates, 18 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 403, 420 (2004) (explaining that fifty-eight Organ
Procurement Organizations exist in the United States, each of which is responsible for a
large area of the country); Organ Procurement Organization, ORGANDONOR.GOV,
http://organdonor.gov/materialsresources/materialsopolist.html (last visited Aug. 18,
2013) (stating that the primary functions of an Organ Procurement Organization are to
increase the number of donors registered and assist in the coordination of the donation
process when a donor becomes available). For an example of an Organ Procurement
Organization, see Gallagher, supra.
143
See U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., supra note 1 (identifying that the hospital
provides the Organ Procurement Organization with the deceased’s information so the
hospital can confirm the deceased’s status as a donor).
144
See id. (specifying that if the deceased did not register as a donor during life and after
death there is no other indication of the deceased’s legal consent—for example a driver’s
license indicator—then the Organ Procurement Organization will seek consent from the
next-of-kin).
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consented during life to organ donation or the decedent’s family
consented following the decedent’s death, then the hospital proceeds
with further medical evaluation of the donor.145
If further evaluation does not prohibit donation, the Organ
Procurement Organization contacts the Organ Procurement and
Transplantation Network to determine whether there is a patient
awaiting a transplant that matches the donor.146 The Organ Procurement
Organization inputs the donor’s characteristics into the computer
network to conduct a comparative analysis with those individuals
awaiting a transplant.147 After the computer network formulates a list of
patients matching the donor, the Organ Precurement Organization offers
organ to the first patient on the match list.148
The procurement coordinator at the Organ Procurement
Organization then immediately contacts the transplant team in charge of
the patient at the top of the list.149 The timeliness of organ procurement
is crucial because organs can only remain outside the human body for a
limited amount of time.150 After the hospital organizes the surgical
transplant team, it takes the donor into surgery where the transplant
See id. (stating that the hospital obtains the deceased’s complete medical and social
history from the family as part of the medical evaluation); see also U.S. Dep’t Health &
Human Servs., About Transplantation: Donor Matching System, ORGAN PROCUREMENT &
TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/about/transplantation/
matchingProcess.asp (last visited Aug. 20, 2013) (pointing out that the Organ Procurement
Organization is responsible for assessing whether the donor is a suitable candidate for
donation).
146
See U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., supra note 1 (identifying that if the
evaluation does not rule out donation, then the Organ Procurement Organization contacts
the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network to start the search for matching
recipients).
147
Id.; see U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., supra note 145 (explaining that the Organ
Procurement Organization enters the donor’s information into the computer network to
find a match).
Characteristics such as “blood type, tissue type, height, and
weight. . . . length of time the patient has been waiting, the severity of the patient’s illness,
and the distance between the donor’s and recipient’s hospitals also figure into who is the
best match for the specific organ.” U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., supra note 1.
However, the network does not consider factors such as race, gender, and financial or
social status. Id.
148
See U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., supra note 1 (recognizing that in some
circumstances the attending surgeon can reject the organ for the patient, for example, if the
patient is too sick).
149
See id. (stating that procurement coordinators offer roughly 75% of organs to local
patients within that Organ Procurement Organization, but if there is no match then the
coordinator offers the organ at the regional and national level).
150
See id. (identifying that time is of the essence in organ procurement); see also Organ
Allocation, supra note 138 (identifying that various organs or tissues can remain outside the
body for the following time ranges: heart for 4–6 hours, liver for 12–24 hours, kidney for
48–72 hours, and lung for 4–6 hours).
145
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team removes any donated organs or tissues.151 Then, the Organ
Procurement Organization representative arranges for transportation of
the procured organ or organs.152 Oftentimes, before the donated organ
arrives at the donee’s hospital, doctors have begun surgery, and the
donee is awaiting the lifesaving organ in the operating room.153
Living organ donation entails a process similar to cadaveric
donation.154 An interested donor must first contact the transplant
center.155 The transplant staff questions the interested donor about his
medical history and explains the risks and benefits of organ donation.156
If the donor remains interested, the staff conducts further tests, including
medical, physical, and psychological evaluations.157 Following the
151
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., supra note 1 (pointing out doctors perform the
surgery under circumstances similar to any regular surgery); see U.S. Dep’t Health &
Human Servs., About Transplantation: Transplant Process, ORGAN PROCUREMENT &
TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/about/transplantation/
transplantProcess.asp (last visited Aug. 20, 2013) (identifying the various individuals that
may be part of the transplant team, including: clinical transplant coordinators, transplant
physicians, transplant surgeons, financial coordinators, and social workers). During the
surgery, doctors first remove the organs and then recover tissue including bone, cornea,
and skin. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., supra note 1.
152
See U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., supra note 1 (stating that most forms of
transportation include airplanes, helicopters, or ambulances).
153
See id. (identifying that typically the transplant recipient is at the hospital and
sometimes in the operating room waiting for the donated organ).
154
Compare supra notes 140–53 and accompanying text (discussing the cadaveric organ
donation process), with Talking About Transplantation: Living Donation Information You Need
to Know, UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING 1 (2009), http://www.unos.org/
docs/Living_Donation.pdf (outlining the process for living organ donation).
155
Talking About Transplantation: Living Donation Information You Need to Know, supra note
154, at 2. In a situation where the donor intends to donate to an identified person, the
donor must contact the transplant center caring for that person. Id. Otherwise, where the
donor wants to make an anonymous donation or non-directed donation, without
specifying the intended recipient, he may contact any transplant center to determine
whether that type of donation is available at the center. Id.
156
See Risks, TRANSPLANT LIVING, http://www.transplantliving.org/living-donation/
being-a-living-donor/risks/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2013) (outlining the risks associated with
living donation); see also Talking About Transplantation: Living Donation Information You Need
to Know, supra note 154, at 2 (specifying that hospitals ask about a person’s medical history
to discover whether the donor has any conditions that would prevent organ donation).
The risks associated with living organ donation include the complications associated with
major surgery, such as: pain, infection, incision hernia, pneumonia, blood clots,
hemorrhaging, allergic reactions from anesthesia, potential need for blood transfusions,
and death. Risks, supra. Other long-term side effects include further complications with the
remaining organ and psychological concerns. Id.
157
Talking about Transplantation: Living Donation Information You Need to Know, supra note
154, at 4. Doctors conduct a physical, psychological, and medical evaluation to ensure the
risks associated with donation are minimal. Id. at 4–6. The types of medical tests
conducted, include: urine testing, chest x-rays, electrocardiogram (EKG), radiological
testing, psychosocial evaluation, psychological evaluation, gynecological examination,
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evaluations, if neither the donor nor the medical personnel have any
concerns regarding the risks associated with donating, then the donor
must complete the living donor informed consent process.158 After freely
providing consent, the donor undergoes surgery for the removal of the
life-saving organ, and the doctors transplant the organ into the donee.159
Although organ donation requires a donor to undergo numerous tedious
evaluations, the egg donor process is not as thorough.160
D. Female Egg Procurement Process
Similar to organ donation, the demand for female reproductive eggs
far exceeds the number of potential egg donors.161 Women are born with
a finite number of eggs, somewhere between one to two million.162
However, at the time of puberty, the ovaries only possess approximately
400,000 to 500,000 eggs of the original one to two million.163 During
cancer screening, blood testing, tissue typing, antibody screening, and screening for
transmittable diseases. Id.
158
See generally id. at 6 (detailing the informed consent process).
159
See
Techniques
for
Organ
Preservation,
MEDSCAPE
REFERENCE,
http://emedicine.medscape.com/article/431140-overview#aw2aab6b5 (last updated Sept.
30, 2011) (identifying updated techniques used for organ preservation, including
hypothermic preservation).
160
See infra Part II.D (considering the female egg donation process).
161
See Frequently Asked Questions, EGGSPLOITATION, http://www.eggsploitation.com/
faq.htm (last visited Aug. 15, 2013) (identifying the demand for female eggs is greater than
the donors available, which is why compensation for egg donation is so high); Roni Caryn
Rabin, As Demand for Donor Eggs Soars, High Prices Stir Ethical Concerns, N.Y. TIMES (May 15,
2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/15/health/15cons.html?_r=0 (pointing out that
the price for donated eggs has increased greatly due to the increased demand and lack of
potential donors); see also Compensation, supra note 24 (identifying that donors receive
compensation for donating eggs, which usually is around $5000 for the first donation). For
examples of websites that help locate egg donors, see EGG DONATION INC,
https://www.eggdonor.com/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2013) and THE EGG DONOR PROGRAM,
http://www.eggdonation.com/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2013).
162
See Egg Donor/Becoming an Egg Donor, JOHNS HOPKINS MED. FERTILITY CTR.,
http://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/fertility/services/donor/index.html (last visited Aug.
15, 2013) (stating that at the time of puberty the ovaries contain only 400,000 to 500,000
eggs); Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 161 (identifying that the number of eggs
decreases as females age). Originally women are born with one to two million eggs. Id. At
the age of puberty, around twelve years old, roughly 300,000 to 400,000 eggs remain. Id.;
see Thinking About Donating Your Eggs? Think Again, CTR. FOR BIOETHICS & CULTURE
NETWORK,
http://www.cbc-network.org/2010/02/thinking-about-donating-your-eggsthink-again/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2013) (explaining that eggs are a non-replenishable
resource).
163
See Egg Donor/Becoming an Egg Donor, supra note 162 (identifying that at puberty only
400,000 to 500,000 eggs remain within the female ovaries); see also EMILY JACKSON,
REGULATING REPRODUCTION:
LAW, TECHNOLOGY AND AUTONOMY 165–66 (2001)
(recognizing that female ova do not regenerate after birth).
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reproductive years, a woman loses about 1000 eggs each month through
the process of atresia, meaning they fail to mature and are gradually
absorbed by the woman’s body.164 In other words, only 400 to 500 of the
original 400,000 to 500,000 eggs will develop to the point of ovulation.165
The remaining 399,500 are lost through atresia.166
The egg donation process consists of two primary stages: (1) ovarian
hyperstimulation; and (2) egg retrieval.167 Prior to beginning the first
stage, the donor undergoes medical screening and testing to ensure that
the donation process is safe to the donor’s health.168 At this time, some
women may also take birth control to assist in regulating their menstrual
cycle.169 Then, during the ovarian hyperstimulation phase, donors
receive various hormonal drug injections that cause the ovaries to
produce a greater number of mature eggs during their menstrual
cycle.170 The first class of drugs creates an artificial menopause in
164
See Egg Donor/Becoming an Egg Donor, supra note 162 (explaining that atresia is when
the eggs “fail to mature and are gradually absorbed by the body between puberty and
menopause”); Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 161 (identifying that the process of
atresia entails egg degeneration so that when a woman undergoes menopause she will
have no remaining eggs).
165
See Egg Donor/Becoming an Egg Donor, supra note 162 (recognizing that only 400 to 500
eggs develop to the point of ovulation during the female’s childbearing years).
166
See id. (identifying that roughly 399,500 to 499,500 eggs undergo atresia).
167
See The Medical Procedure of Egg Donation, EGG DONOR INFO. PROJECT,
http://www.stanford.edu/class/siw198q/websites/eggdonor/procedures.html (last
visited Aug. 15, 2013) (acknowledging that egg donation consists of two phases).
168
See Egg Donor Screening, EGG DONOR INFO. PROJECT, http://www.stanford.edu/class/
siw198q/websites/eggdonor/screening.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2013) (outlining that
clinics have not implemented standardized screening guidelines and that the process often
differs among the numerous clinics). Donors generally must provide detailed information
regarding their medical history in order to check for genetic abnormalities or diseases. Id.
In addition, doctors conduct a fertility evaluation to verify the donor’s capacity to produce
eggs. Id. Following these initial tests, doctors conduct a more thorough physical
examination that includes blood testing for blood type, RH incompatibility, HIV, hepatitis,
syphilis, drug use, chlamydia, gonorrhea, and HTLV I. Id. It is equally important that the
donor inform the clinic of any menstrual abnormalities or hormonal imbalances, which are
indications of a pituitary tumor. Id. This is a concern because one of the drugs provided
during the hyperstimulation phase can aggravate the tumor and lead to a stroke or brain
damage. Id.
169
See The Medical Procedure of Egg Donation, supra note 167 (stating that doctors
encourage and require some women to take birth control to ensure a more consistent
menstrual cycle).
170
See id. (specifying that the first stage of the hormonal drug regimen uses
gonadotropin-releasing hormone agonist analogues); see also How the Egg Donor Process
Works, CTR. FOR HUM. REPROD., http://www.centerforhumanreprod.com/egg_donor.html
(last visited Aug. 15, 2013) (pointing out that egg donors use daily injections that stimulate
the ovaries). Donors often administer these drugs through daily injections. The Medical
Procedure of Egg Donation, supra note 167. Other alternatives to the injection include a daily
nasal spray or a single injection of Depot Lupron at the start of the treatment. Id.
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donors.171 This allows for physicians, through the use of other
medications, to control the ovulation and maturation of the donor’s
eggs.172
After doctors effectively control the hormone levels through the first
set of drugs, the donor undergoes another set of daily injections that
encourages the development of multiple egg follicles.173 The production
of multiple egg follicles allows doctors to retrieve more than one mature
egg during a single retrieval procedure.174 After testing reveals that the
donor’s eggs are matured, the doctor injects the donor with human
chorionic gonadotropin, triggering ovulation.175 Thirty-four to thirty-six
hours after the injection, the donor undergoes the second stage: egg
retrieval.176
During egg retrieval, the doctors perform a surgical procedure,
known as transvaginal ultrasound aspiration, while the donor is under
conscious sedation.177 The physician uses a tube attached to an
ultrasound probe and guides a suctioning needle into each of the donor’s
ovaries, removing mature eggs from the follicles.178 Following the

See The Medical Procedure of Egg Donation, supra note 167 (identifying that doctors use
the first class of drugs to “suppress the release of luteinizing hormone (LH) by the pituitary
gland, which normally triggers eggs to mature within the body”).
172
See id. (addressing that physicians have the ability through other medications to
control the conditions of egg maturation and ovulation); see also How the Egg Donor Process
Works, supra note 170 (explaining that doctors closely monitor donors to ensure that their
ovaries do not go into hyperstimulation).
173
See The Medical Procedure of Egg Donation, supra note 167 (identifying that the second
drug regimen utilizes a “follicle stimulating hormone (FSH) or human menopausal
gonadotropin (hMG)”).
174
See id. (stating that multiple egg follicles allow “the physician to retrieve several
mature eggs at one time”). Typically, only one egg matures during each cycle, but due to
the gonadotropin injections, more than one egg matures. How the Egg Donor Process Works,
supra note 170. Due to the increased level of fertility at this stage, doctors often prohibit
donors from engaging in sexual intercourse. The Medical Procedure of Egg Donation, supra
note 167. Donors must undergo daily ultrasounds and blood tests during the last few days
of the hyperstimulation phase. Id.
175
See The Medical Procedure of Egg Donation, supra note 167 (identifying that a single
injection of the human chorionic gonadotropin triggers the donor’s ovulation).
176
See id. (“Egg retrieval occurs 34–36 hours after this injection.”); see also How the Egg
Donor Process Works, supra note 170 (recognizing that doctors retrieve the eggs about two
days after the injection of human chorionic gonadotropin).
177
See The Medical Procedure of Egg Donation, supra note 167 (explaining the donor
undergoes transvaginal ultrasound aspiration, which is a surgical procedure performed
while the donor is under conscious sedation).
178
See id. (“Using a tube attached to an ultrasound probe, a physician guides a suctioning
needle into each ovary and removes mature [eggs] from the follicles.”); see also How the Egg
Donor Process Works, supra note 170 (explaining that the stage of egg retrieval involves “an
aspiration needle, guided by ultrasound . . . [that] is used transvaginally to aspirate the
171
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procedure, donors remain in the clinic for a few hours before returning
home for further recovery.179 The medical field recognizes various side
effects associated with both stages of the egg donation process.180
However, the medical community knows very little about the long-term
effects of procuring female ova.181 Following egg retrieval, doctors
fertilize the eggs obtained from the donor with the partner’s semen.182
eggs”). Sometimes doctors give the donor an oral medication to prevent nausea during the
surgical procedure. The Medical Procedure of Egg Donation, supra note 167.
179
See The Medical Procedure of Egg Donation, supra note 167 (identifying that the donor
remains in the clinic for one to two hours after the procedure before returning home to
recover).
180
See id. (identifying the various side effects associated with each phase of the egg
donation process); see also Egg “Donation” and Exploitation of Women, CENTER FOR BIOETHICS
& CULTURE NETWORK, http://www.cbc-network.org/issues/making-life/egg-donationand-exploitation-of-women/ (last visited Aug. 24, 2013) (identifying the short-term health
complications of egg donation, which include: “ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome
(OHSS), loss of fertility, ovarian torsion, blood clots, kidney disease, premature
menopause, ovarian cysts, chronic pelvic pain, stroke, reproductive cancers, and in some
cases, death”); Egg Donation Risks—7 Dangers of Donating Eggs, FERTILITY NATION,
http://www.fertilitynation.com/7-egg-donation-risks-every-donor-should-know-about/
(last visited Aug. 24, 2013) (explaining the various risks associated with egg donation). See
generally INST. OF MED. & NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF NAT’L ACADS., ASSESSING THE
MEDICAL RISKS OF HUMAN OOCYTE DONATION FOR STEM CELL RESEARCH 11 (Linda Giudice
et al. eds., 2007) (pointing out various risks of egg donation). Side effects of ovarian
hyperstimulation include: allergic reactions to the medication, abdominal swelling, mood
swings, bruising at injection sights, tension and pressure in the ovarian area, temporary
menopausal symptoms, unintentional pregnancy, and ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome
(“OHSS”) which can result in death. The Medical Procedure of Egg Donation, supra note 167.
One study identified that OHSS affects 1% to 10% of egg donors. Id. OHSS can also result
in dehydration, blood clotting disorders, and kidney damage. Id. A majority of donors
experience pain and mild side effects from the process. Id. One survey revealed that 64%
of donors found the physical side effects to be a negative consequence of donation. Id. On
the other hand, side effects from the egg retrieval stage include damage to other organs
found near the ovaries, such as the bladder, bowel, blood vessels, or uterus. Id. The
process also results in discomfort, although the donor is under mild anesthesia. Id. One
study found that 1.5% of donors had complications during the retrieval process and
required hospitalization. Id.
181
See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 161 (identifying that research about longterm effects of egg donation is not readily available, although there is widespread research
about infertile women); Thinking About Donating Your Eggs? Think Again, supra note 162
(recognizing that the long-term side effects of egg donation are unknown because there is a
lack of long-term medical research and follow up with former egg donors); see also Mary
Ann Toman-Miller, Panelists Discuss Egg Donor Risks, STANFORD DAILY (May 2, 2012),
http://www.stanforddaily.com/2012/05/02/panelists-discuss-egg-donor-risks/ (“No
financial compensation is enough to make up for the potential long-term health
consequences of egg donation.”). Egg donation is inherently risky and can result in
“[s]troke, organ failure, infection, cancer, loss of future fertility, and in rare instances, even
death.” Id.
182
See How the Egg Donor Process Works, supra note 170 (explaining that fertilization of the
egg occurs before transferring the egg into the recipient).
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The resulting embryos are incubated and graded before being
transferred into the donee’s uterus, about three days after the egg
retrieval process.183
Although the procedures of organ and egg donation are distinct, the
two procurement methods also contain many similarities.184 Thus, Part
III of this Note analyzes the current legal framework and evaluates why
Congress has failed to treat the two donation processes in the same
manner.185 Only after thoroughly examining the current methods
employed can one gain a better understanding of the need for a
supervised market approach to organ and egg donation.186
III. ANALYSIS
The current legal framework for organ and egg donation are
markedly different, although both organs and eggs are in high demand
and the donation procedures entail various risks.187 This Part analyzes
the discrepancies between organ donation and egg donation.188 First,
Part III.A examines the legal definition of property and how the
judiciary’s interpretation of property rights in the human body placed
limits on the adoption of a market approach to the organ procurement
process.189 Second, Part III.B considers the advantages and shortcomings
of the primary federal statute that governs organ donation: NOTA.190
Third, Part III.C analyzes the similarities between the organ and egg
This analysis reveals that the current
procurement processes.191
legislation governing organ donation has ineffectively increased the
organ supply, and thus, the legislature should amend NOTA and adopt
a supervised market approach for organ and egg donation.192
See id. (identifying that approximately three days after fertilization, doctors transfer
the egg into the donee).
184
See infra Part III.C (examining the similarities between organ and egg donation).
185
See infra Part III (analyzing the case law, legislation, and methods that govern organ
donation).
186
See infra Part IV (proposing a supervised market approach to the donation systems).
187
See supra text accompanying notes 1, 161 (recognizing the high demand for organs and
eggs); supra notes 156, 180–81 (explaining the risks associated with organ donation and egg
donation).
188
See infra Part III.C (discussing the numerous similarities between the organ and egg
donation processes).
189
See infra Part III.A (analyzing the consequences of the judiciary’s failure to recognize
property rights in the human body).
190
See infra Part III.B (examining the prohibition on the sale of organs under NOTA).
191
See infra Part III.C (analogizing the organ and egg donation processes and disputing
the criticisms relating to adopting a market system).
192
See infra Part IV (suggesting an amendment to NOTA that would implement a
supervised market system for organ and egg donation).
183
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A. What Rights Do Individuals Maintain in the Human Body?
Although some courts recognize a quasi-property right in a
decedent’s remains and a privacy right in a living person’s bodily
organs, the Supreme Court has not addressed this issue.193 State and
federal jurisdictions have consistently rejected the argument that a
person has an absolute property interest in a living or deceased human
body.194 This Part considers the reasons most courts have failed to
classify the human body as property in the fullest sense of the term.195
Property is commonly referred to as a bundle of rights.196 This
includes the right to possess, use, exclude, sell, and dispose of the
property.197 Currently, the court system does not acknowledge an

193
See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 489 (Cal. 1990) (refusing
to recognize that an individual “retains a sufficient interest in excised cells to support a
cause of action for conversion”); Cohen v. Groman Mortuary, Inc., 41 Cal. Rptr. 481, 483
(Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (identifying a quasi-property right to the decedent’s corpse for burial
purposes); Sanford v. Ware, 60 S.E.2d 10, 12 (Va. 1950) (“Although there is no right of
property in a commercial sense in the dead body of a human being, the right to bury and
preserve the remains is recognized and protected as a quasi-property right.”).
194
See Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786, 797 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that the
next-of-kin’s right to possess a decedent family member’s body created a property interest
afforded due process protection and recognizing that even though state law forbids the
trading of body parts, it does not follow that such restriction strips the next-of-kin of a
property interest in the decedent’s body); Whaley v. County of Tuscola, 58 F.3d 1111, 1114
(6th Cir. 1995) (explaining that a common law right vests in the next-of-kin to possess the
body for burial and to bring a claim against persons who disturb the body); Brotherton v.
Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that a deprivation of constitutionally
protected property took place when a coroner removed and donated the decedent’s
corneas without first obtaining consent); Crocker v. Pleasant, 778 So. 2d 978, 985 (Fla. 2001)
(narrowing the scope of State v. Powell by recognizing that the narrow construction given to
the statute in Powell does not translate into a generalized conclusion that the Fourteenth
Amendment should not protect the right to possess a family member’s remains for burial
purposes); State v. Powell, 497 So. 2d 1188, 1191–92 (Fla. 1986) (reasoning that the removal
of the decedent’s corneas without consent did not violate the state constitution because a
person’s constitutional rights end upon death and the next-of-kin possesses no property
right in the decedent’s remains); Georgia Lions Eye Bank, Inc. v. Lavant, 335 S.E.2d 127, 128
(Ga. 1985) (holding that any quasi-property right that the next-of-kin possesses in a corpse
was one established at common law and not created by either the United States or Georgia
constitutions, and thus the court upheld the Georgia cornea removal statute).
195
See supra Part II.A (acknowledging that courts have failed to identify an absolute
property right in the human body).
196
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1335 (9th ed. 2009); see Jaffe, supra note 48, at 528 (arguing
that the body is property and deserves protection under the Due Process and Takings
Clauses of the U.S. Constitution).
197
See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982)
(explaining that property includes “the rights ‘to possess, use and dispose’” (quoting
United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945))).
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absolute property interest in the human body.198 Arguably, it is
difficulty to recognize the body as property because there is not a general
right to sell the human body or its subparts; thus, it lacks an essential
quality of property.199 The right to sell is so essential to a property
interest that the lack of this attribute disqualifies the human body from
classification as property.200
Justice Frankfurter stated that one of the distinguishing
characteristics of property is that it is “capable of transfer from owner to
owner and thus of exchange for some equivalent.”201 Through the organ
procurement process, human organs and tissues are capable of transfer
from owner to owner.202 However, Congress established a system, under
NOTA, that disallows the exchange for some equivalent.203
Thus,

198
See Cohen, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 483 (acknowledging that the next-of-kin maintains a quasiproperty right to a decedent’s corpse for burial purposes); Powell, 497 So. 2d at 1192
(reasoning that a person’s constitutional rights end upon death and the next-of-kin
possesses no property right in the decedent’s remains); Georgia Lions Eye Bank, Inc., 335
S.E.2d at 128 (holding that the common law established the quasi-property right to
recognize the interests of surviving relatives to control the decedent’s remains; however,
this right is not of a constitutional dimension); Sanford, 60 S.E.2d at 12 (declining to
recognize a property right for commercial purposes in a decedent’s body; however, the
next-of-kin held a protected quasi-property right to bury and preserve the decedent’s
remains); see also Hannemann, supra note 56, at 404 (explaining that prior to the American
court’s recognition of a right to donate one’s organs, the common law failed to identify a
property right in the body).
199
See Jaffe, supra note 48, at 551 (claiming that the inability to sell human body parts
creates issues with classifying the body as a property in the fullest sense of the term). See
generally 42 U.S.C. § 274e (2006) (banning the sale of human organs).
200
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 868 cmt. a (1979) (discussing the Restatement
section regarding interference with dead bodies). Comment a states:
One who is entitled to the disposition of the body of a deceased person
has a cause of action in tort against one who intentionally, recklessly or
negligently mistreats or improperly deals with the body, or prevents
its proper burial or cremation. The technical basis of the cause of action
is the interference with the exclusive right of control of the body,
which frequently has been called by the courts a “property” or a
“quasi-property” right. This [right of control] does not, however, fit
very well into the category of property, since the body ordinarily
cannot be sold or transferred, has no utility and can be used only for
the one purpose of interment or cremation.
Id. But see Jaffe, supra note 48, at 551 (discussing that the notion of property does not
always include the right to sell because other items deemed property—such as “certain
licenses, drugs for restricted use and, under some circumstances, leases”—are also not
alienable (footnotes omitted)).
201
Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 5 (1949).
202
See supra Part II.C (discussing the organ donation process).
203
See 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (identifying it is “unlawful for any person to knowingly
acquire, receive or otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable consideration for use
in human transplantation”); see also id. § 274e(c)(2) (stating “valuable consideration” does
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Congress’s decision to criminalize the sale of organs stripped a living
person of the ability to claim a property interest in his bodily organs
under the legal definition of the term.204
Moore v. Regents of the University of California is a prime example of
the judiciary’s refusal to recognize the living body as property.205 In
Moore, the California Appellate Court properly identified a lack of public
policy and statutory authority against realizing an absolute property
interest in one’s body.206 However, the Supreme Court of California
expressly denied the conversion of property claim, explaining that public
policy implications balanced in favor of not allowing Moore to retain
ownership rights in his own cells.207 Undoubtedly, the court feared that
the creation of such rights would discourage the exchange of biological
materials and impede on the biotechnology industry.208 Yet, it seems
that the opposite result has since occurred, and the court’s failure to
recognize a property right in the human body instead has inhibited the
exchange of human biological materials and contributed to the shortage
of transplantable organs.209

not encompass the donor’s reasonable payments for medical expenses from the donation
process or expenses associated with travel, housing, and lost wages).
204
See 42 U.S.C. § 274e (recognizing the inability to “acquire, receive or otherwise transfer
a human organ for valuable consideration” prohibits the ability to sell the organ).
205
See Dunham, supra note 1, at 52 (pointing out that Moore v. Regents of the University of
California is a benchmark case and the judiciary has chosen to limit the property rights that
exist in the body of the dead while failing to extend the rights to a living person’s body).
Similarly, other courts have failed to recognize an absolute property right in the human
body but have instead recognized that one may not compel a person to donate their body
parts or tissues. See, e.g., McFall v. Shimp. 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90, 90–91 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1978)
(denying McFall’s injunction and remarking that under the common law “one human
being is under no legal compulsion to give aid or to take action to save another human
being or to rescue”); see also A Cousin’s Stunning Refusal to Donate Bone Marrow Leaves Robert
McFall Facing Death, supra note 60 (explaining the family turmoil surrounding Shimp’s
refusal to donate his bone marrow to McFall).
206
Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 249 Cal. Rptr. 494, 504 (Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (“[N]o
public policy has ever been articulated, nor is there any statutory authority, against a
property interest in one’s own body.”).
207
See Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 492 (Cal. 1990) (holding that a
patient must hold the ultimate power to control what happens to his tissues and that
negative public policy would result from allowing a patient to retain a property right in
such tissues after doctors remove them).
208
See Dunham, supra note 1, at 53 (stating the policy consideration was “the fear that the
establishment of such rights would hinder the free exchange of human biological
materials”). But see GOLD, supra note 72, at 26–27 (recognizing that the exchange of human
biological materials is crucial to the future of healthcare).
209
See Data, supra note 26 (outlining that 119,246 people were awaiting a transplant on
August 15, 2013, but that doctors only performed 11,579 total transplants between January
and May of 2013); Lieberman & Brown, supra note 4 (mentioning that according to the U.S.
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The Supreme Court of California failed to consider that recognizing
the human body as property would allow for the implementation of a
market system for organ donation and would enhance the supply of
organs.210 Arguably, “courts are likely to award property rights if to do
so will enhance such trade.”211 Yet, “[i]f . . . the allocation of property
rights . . . hinder[s] trade in the good, the court is unlikely to award a
property right.”212 Recognizing a property interest in human organs
would enhance the availability of organs. If courts recognized the
human body as property, individuals could buy and sell organs legally
rather than engaging in the illegal purchase and sale that currently exists
on the black market.213
Further, the adoption of a market system for organ donation would
create implications opposite those feared by the California Supreme

Department of Health and Human Services, “[o]ver 100,000 people in the United States
need organ transplants and 18 people die each day waiting for one”).
210
See GOLD, supra note 72, at 44 (identifying that the Supreme Court in Moore quickly
concluded that a market system would be against public policy, without considering the
potential benefits that could have resulted from adopting a market approach).
211
Id.
212
Id.
213
See Calandrillo, supra note 111, at 86 (identifying that it is illegal to buy or sell a
human organ in almost all developed nations, with the exception of Iran and Pakistan,
which operate a legal market for the sale of organs); Shapiro, supra note 113, at 20 (asserting
that a booming transplant tourism industry has emerged along with a global black market
in human organs); see also Gayle, supra note 28 (stating that the World Health Organization
warns that once an hour someone sells an organ on the market and “[t]he U[nited]
N[ations] public health body estimates that 10,000 organs are now traded every year”);
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., supra note 28 (illustrating the drastic increase in the
demand for organs, although the supply of transplants and donors fails to climb as
rapidly). The below graph represents the increase in the demand for organs in the United
States from 1989 to 2009.

Id.
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Court in Moore.214 Rather than discouraging the exchange of organs, the
creation of property rights would strengthen the number of available
human organs because the supply would increase if compensation were
allowed.215 This system would benefit both the biotechnology industry
and the thousands of lives awaiting a lifesaving organ transplant.216
In addition, recognizing the human body as property would allow
individuals to contract for the sale of their organs, either during life or
after death.217 In Greenberg, the U.S. district court allowed the plaintiffs
to proceed under their contract claim of unjust enrichment.218 On the
other hand, other courts, such as the court in Perry, have rejected breach
of contract claims concerning the disposal of a decedent’s remains.219
Recognizing a property right in the human body would benefit society
and also increase society’s confidence in organ donation because
individuals would likely have a remedy under contract law in
circumstances where hospitals did not honor their wishes.220

214
See Dunham, supra note 1, at 59 (recognizing that the government’s altruistic approach
has been failing for several decades). See generally Crespi, supra note 2 (insisting the
adoption of a futures market for organ donation would benefit the organ shortage).
215
See Dunham, supra note 1, at 53 (“[O]ffering compensation for organs will not
necessarily lead to exploitation—on the contrary, it may be regarded as necessary to
minimize the level of inequities that exists in current organ procurement systems.”).
216
See Data, supra note 26 (explaining that although 119,246 people are awaiting a
transplant, only 5692 organs were recovered between January and May of 2013); The Kidney
Transplant Waiting List, supra note 26 (explaining that the kidney transplant waiting list has
increased by 3000 to 4000 people each year); The Troubling Shortage of Organ Donors in the
U.S., supra note 27 (“Over 110,000 Americans are on the list for organs, and more than
87,000 of these patients need kidneys[,] [yet] only about 17,000 Americans get kidneys each
year, while more than 4,600 die waiting.”); U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., supra note
28 (explaining various statistics concerning the demand for organ donors). Daily, an
average of seventy-nine people will receive an organ transplant, and eighteen people will
die waiting for a transplant. The Troubling Shortage of Organ Donors in the U.S., supra note
27.
217
See supra notes 98–104 and accompanying text (discussing the provisions of the UAGA
and the ability to transfer an anatomical gift). Under the UAGA, a person can create a
contract or will to specify their intent to execute an anatomical gift. Supra note 98; see Nat’l
Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, supra note 107 (discussing various reasons
each state should adopt the UAGA).
218
Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1073
(S.D. Fla. 2003); see supra notes 79–80 and accompanying text (stating that the Greenberg
court allowed the claim of unjust enrichment but denied the other five counts, including
conversion).
219
Perry v. Saint Francis Hosp. & Med. Ctr., Inc., 886 F. Supp. 1551, 1561, 1563 (D. Kan.
1995); see supra note 54 and accompanying text (identifying that the court denied the
family’s claim for breach of contract with regard to the consent form executed by the
widow).
220
See Talk of the Nation: Human Organ Trade, supra note 28 (discussing the social concerns
and moral implications of adopting a market system for organ donation). Conan identifies
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B. The Legislature’s Favorable or Unfavorable Treatment of Organ Donation
The legislature placed limitations on the sale of human organs, but
has not expressly restricted the development of a market system for egg
procurement.221 In creating NOTA, Congress reacted quickly out of fear
of a market system for organ donation and failed to adequately consider
the consequences of its actions.222 This Part briefly examines Congress’s
intent in placing restrictions on organs and considers why Congress has
not approached egg donation in the same manner.
Congress assumed without further consideration that allowing
compensation for organ donors would impinge upon fundamental social
norms.223 However, Congress made no attempt to examine alternative
that society has lost confidence in the organ donation process due to the misappropriation
of organs and theft of body parts. Id.
221
See supra Part II.B (discussing the uniform model code’s and statute’s limitation on the
organ donation process, including NOTA, which prohibits the sale of human organs but
does not define “organ” as including sperm or ovum); see also Gorsline & Johnson, supra
note 44, at 10 (discussing the 1987 amendments to the UAGA that limited a person’s right
to dispose of their remains by restricting the sale or purchase of human body parts).
Although Congress did not establish the UAGA, it undoubtedly influenced the adoption of
NOTA, and NOTA subsequently influenced the alterations made to the UAGA in 2006. See
Legislative Fact Sheet—Anatomical Gift Act (2006), supra note 105 (recognizing that the
National Conference of Commissioners revised the UAGA in light of subsequent changes
in federal laws concerning organ donation). See generally Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on
Unif. State Laws, supra note 107 (explaining why each state should adopt the UAGA); U.S.
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., supra note 106 (presenting a map that identifies the states
that have adopted the various versions of the UAGA).
222
See Calandrillo, supra note 111, at 79 (identifying that Dr. Barry Jacobs’s proposed
organ brokerage, which would have permitted the sale and purchase of organs, did not
receive wide support from the National Kidney Foundation or American politicians); Satel
& Hippen, supra note 113, at 188 (explaining that Congress promulgated the provision
against the sale of organs after Dr. Jacobs, a Virginia physician, attempted to institute an
organ brokerage called the International Kidney Exchange); see also Statz, supra note 109, at
1685 (recognizing that when Congress passed NOTA an estimated “20,000 people died
annually under circumstances that would allow for organ transplantation but that organs
were procured from less than 15% of them”); Talk of the Nation: Human Organ Trade, supra
note 28 (discussing the social and moral consequences of adopting a market system). See
generally Policy Management National Organ Transplant Act, supra note 136 (recognizing that
another fundamental purpose behind NOTA was the creation of the Organ Procurement
and Transplantation Network that would be responsible for developing a national registry
for organ matching).
223
See Crespi, supra note 2, at 15 (explaining that Congress quickly assumed, without
reflection, that any form of compensation would violate social norms). But see Derco, supra
note 122, at 160 (recognizing that NOTA’s legislative history never explicitly defined
“valuable consideration,” rather “the Senate’s Labor and Human Resources Committee
Report stated that ‘[i]t is the sense of the Committee that individuals or organizations
should not profit by the sale of human organs for transplantation’”). As a result, the term
“valuable consideration” has encouraged a broad interpretation so as to avoid the potential
consequences of violating NOTA. See Wait-Listed to Death: Improving Incentives for Organ
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frameworks that could harness financial incentives to increase organ
availability without transgressing those norms.224 The thought alone of
purchasing or selling human organs caused Congress to react quickly in
enacting the provision in NOTA that bans the sale of organs.225
Yet, why has the legislature not taken a similar approach to egg
donation? Currently, there is no federal law prohibiting financial
compensation for egg or sperm donation.226 In fact, Louisiana is the only
state that has enacted a law prohibiting an egg donor from receiving
compensation.227 The same negative societal implications related to
organ donation are also associated with egg donation, but Congress and
forty-nine other states, not including Louisiana, have failed to implement
any legislative protections for egg donors.228 Also, egg donation is
arguably more dangerous because of the medical field’s failure to study

Donations, supra note 130 (explaining that the threat of criminal penalties has encouraged a
broad interpretation of “valuable consideration”).
224
See Crespi, supra note 2, at 15 (noting that Congress conducted very little policy
analysis in promulgating NOTA); see also Gorsline & Johnson, supra note 44, at 19
(identifying that the national system designed to facilitate organ sharing and procurement
has failed to alleviate the organ shortage). Crespi points out that the legislative history of
NOTA reveals that Congress failed to conduct a thorough analysis of the prohibition on all
organ sales. Crespi, supra note 2, at 15. Since then, Congress has reaffirmed the blanket
prohibition on the sale of organs, due mainly to the observation that society’s values are
against viewing the human body as a commodity. Id. Thus, to encourage the altruistic
nature of organ donation, the ban on all organs remains. Id.; Talk of the Nation: Human
Organ Trade, supra note 28 (discussing the social concerns and moral implications of
adopting a market system for organ donation).
225
See supra notes 112–15 and accompanying text (discussing Congress’s fear of a market
system developing for organs).
226
See 42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(1) (2006) (excluding the term gametes or ova specifically from
the definition of a human organ); UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 1(7) (2006) (amended
2008) (defining the word “part” as “an organ, an eye, or tissue of a human being”). There is
some debate about whether the UAGA prohibits the sale of eggs because the definition of
organ under the 1987 UAGA is broad and encompasses “blood, fluid, or other portion of
the human body.” See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 1(7) (1987) (defining the word “part”
as “an organ, tissue, eye, bone, artery, blood, fluid, or other portion of a human body”). See
generally Crockin, supra note 57, at 241 (discussing the law as it relates to egg donation);
Compensation, supra note 24 (recognizing that donors receive $5000 after completing their
first egg donation and often receive a larger amount of compensation during a second or
third donation).
227
See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:122 (2008) (“The sale of human ovum, fertilized human
ovum, or human embryo is expressly prohibited.”); see also Robertson, supra note 24, at
182–83 (considering state legislation prohibiting the sale of organs and analyzing whether
prosecution for the sale of eggs has occurred under those statutes).
228
See Robertson, supra note 24, at 182–83 (recognizing state statutes that prohibit the sale
of organs have not resulted in prosecutions for the sale of eggs).
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the long-term consequences of the egg donation process.229 In fact, some
fear that egg donation causes cancer and other long-term health
complications.230 Thus, although Congress has not chosen to treat organ
and egg donation similarly under NOTA, the similarities between the
two procurement processes demand that Congress employ a new
approach.231
C. Organ Donation vs. Egg Donation
In the United States, egg donation operates under a market approach
that allows a recipient to pay out of pocket compensation to an egg
donor.232 Organ procurement, on the other hand, operates primarily
under an altruistic model.233 The idea of adopting a market system for
229
See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 161 (identifying that the research on longterm medical effects for the donor is not readily available, although there is widespread
research about infertile women).
230
See Thinking About Donating Your Eggs? Think Again, supra note 162 (identifying that
egg donation is inherently risky and can result in “[s]troke, organ failure, infection, cancer,
loss of future fertility, and in rare instances, even death”). However, the long-term side
effects are unknown because there is a lack of long-term medical research or follow-up
with former egg donors. Id.
231
See infra Part III.C (evaluating the similarities between organ donation and egg
donation).
232
See Egg Donor Compensation, supra note 24 (explaining that clinics compensate egg
donors anywhere from $5000 to $10,000 for their services). The website identifies that the
donor company adheres to the American Society for Reproductive Medicine guidelines and
states that “[a]lthough there is no consensus on the precise payment that oocyte donors
should receive, at this time sums of $5,000 or more require justification and sums above
$10,000 go beyond what is appropriate.” Id. Furthermore, if a donor must travel, the
recipient reimburses those expenses provided that the donor retains all original receipts.
Id.; see Cost Estimate for Egg Donation, supra note 24 (displaying an itemized list of fees
associated with egg donation including: a donor fee from $7000 or more which increases
with each donation; travel expenses if the donor must travel ranging from $4000 to $6000; a
monitoring deposit if the donor is not local and needs a monitoring facility priced at $1500
to $2000; $200 in medical fees if after the first screening the program determines that the
donor is not appropriate through no fault of their own). Thus, clinics estimate that the total
compensation is between $13,850 and $14,850 plus additional expenses ranging from $5500
to $8000. Id.
233
See supra note 133 and accompanying text (recognizing the organ donation system in
the United States operates under an altruistic model); see also U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., supra note 1 (recognizing that the process of organ donation is primarily
altruistic). See generally About Us, supra note 137 (providing an overview of UNOS—the
non-profit organization responsible for maintaining the organ transplant system); Organ
Allocation, supra note 138 (describing the network responsible for allocating available
organs); Talking about Transplantation: Living Donation Information You Need to Know, supra
note 154 (explaining the process of living organ donation); Techniques for Organ Preservation,
supra note 159 (discussing how medical personnel preserve and transfer organs); U.S. Dep’t
of Health & Human Servs., supra note 132 (outlining how to join the National Transplant
Waiting List and plan for the expenses associated with organ procurement).
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organ procurement raises concerns about exploitation.234 But is egg
donation so distinct from organ donation that a market approach is
appropriate for one and not the other?235 This Part analyzes the
similarities between the two donation processes and considers why the
legislature placed restrictions on organ procurement but chose to not
enforce similar restrictions on the market system for egg donation.
Organ donation is analogous to egg donation in many respects.236
First, both procedures are physically invasive and can cause various
health risks to donors.237 For instance, the procurement of an organ
involves a major surgery to remove the organ, which can result in
complications.238 Egg donation similarly involves a surgical procedure
that can cause various short-term health effects or other long-term
consequences.239 However, society does not widely recognize the longterm complications due to the medical field’s failure to follow up with

234
But see Dunham, supra note 1, at 58 (stating that compensation for organs will not
necessarily cause exploitation but could assist in minimizing the inequities that currently
exist in the organ procurement system).
235
See Egg Donor Compensation, supra note 24 (claiming that egg donation is an altruistic
act and that compensation serves to reimburse the donor’s time and effort rather than serve
as the donor’s primary motivation); see also Gordon, supra note 133 (reporting that research
of eighty egg donors revealed women’s motivation for becoming an egg donor varied).
Around 30% of women acknowledged they were motivated solely by the altruism of egg
donation. Id. On the other hand, 20% claimed that the money alone was their reason for
donating. Id. The greatest motivation, about 40%, recognized that both the altruism and
promise of money served as their reason for becoming an egg donor. Id.
236
See infra text accompanying notes 237–48 (explaining that both donation processes
involve physically invasive procedures, concern nonrenewable body parts, and play a
crucial role in giving the gift of life).
237
See Risks, supra note 156 (outlining the various risks associated with living organ
donation). These risks include: pain, infection, incisional hernia, pneumonia, blood clots,
hemorrhaging, allergic reactions from anesthesia, a need for blood transfusions, and
potentially even death. Id. Other long-term side effects include complications with other
organs or psychological problems. Id.; see Egg Donation Risks—7 Dangers of Donating Eggs,
supra note 180 (identifying the various long- and short-term risks associated with egg
donation).
238
See supra note 156 and accompanying text (identifying the risks of the organ
procurement process).
239
See Egg “Donation” and Exploitation of Women, supra note 180 (recognizing various
short-term health complications associated with egg donation); see also INST. OF MED. &
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF NAT’L ACADS., supra note 180 (identifying the potential risks
of egg donation). See generally Egg Donor/Becoming an Egg Donor, supra note 162 (explaining
the surgical process that a woman undergoes in donating her eggs); Egg Donor Screening,
supra note 168 (outlining the screening process that donors undergo prior to donating their
eggs); How the Egg Donor Process Works, supra note 170 (providing an overview of the
donation process, which includes a page that answers frequent questions posed by donors);
The Medical Procedure of Egg Donation, supra note 167 (explaining the different phases of the
egg donation process).
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egg donors after the egg procurement process.240 Thus, there is currently
a lack of medical research addressing any potential long-term
consequences of egg donation.241
Second, neither eggs nor organs are considered renewable within the
human body.242 Humans are born with a finite number of organs,
although there are a much larger number of human tissues.243 Similarly,
every female human body produces a finite number of eggs, ranging
from 400,000 to 500,000 at the time of puberty.244 However, through the
process of atresia, this number declines monthly by roughly 1000 eggs,
and only 400 to 500 of the original 400,000 to 500,000 eggs develop to the
point of ovulation.245
Third, both serve an important social function through saving or
creating a human life.246 Organ donation provides an individual with
the opportunity to “save a life by donating an organ to someone in
need.”247 Similarly, egg donation gives women the opportunity to
provide the gift of life to a family that is unable to conceive a child on
their own.248
However, the legislature’s failure to control both
procurement procedures in the same manner gives more value to the
240
See Toman-Miller, supra note 181 (explaining that “the long-term effects of egg
harvesting are uncertain, with better tracking needed”).
241
See INST. OF MED. AND NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 180
(explaining that long-term risks could potentially include breast, ovarian, and endometrial
cancer or complications with future fertility).
242
JACKSON, supra note 163, at 165–66 (explaining that human eggs do not regenerate
after birth unlike human sperm, which constantly renew within the male human body).
243
Shapiro & Bartlett, supra note 65 (identifying tissue as “anything [that is] not a live
organ and can be recovered from a dead body”). Each year, 1.5 million tissues are turned
into medical products that are later given to American patients. Id. Examples of these
medical products include: “[a] tendon from a cadaver can be used to repair a torn ACL;
veins are used in heart bypass operations[;] [d]ental implants can be made from ground-up
human bone, turned into a paste[;] [b]one also gets turned into screws and plates that look
like something found in hardware stores[,] [and] [s]urgeons can use them to repair a
broken leg.” Id.
244
See supra note 163 and accompanying text (explaining that the number of ova
remaining in the female body at the time of puberty ranges from 400,000 to 500,000 eggs).
245
See supra notes 164–66 and accompanying text (discussing atresia and the fact that
only 400 to 500 eggs ever reach the point of ovulation).
246
See Why Be an Organ Donor?, supra note 28 (explaining that being an organ donor
provides the donor with the opportunity to save a life).
247
See id. (discussing the benefits of organ donation). The benefits of organ donation for
a donor and his family are the ability to save lives and comfort grieving families. Id. An
organ donor can save up to eight lives and can save or improve up to fifty lives through the
donation of tissues and eyes after death. Id. Furthermore, donating organs provides
families who suffered the loss of a loved one comfort in knowing that their loved one’s
organs saved another’s life. Id.
248
See Gordon, supra note 133 (recognizing women who donated eggs felt a sense of
pride in having the ability to help an infertile couple).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2013

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 48, No. 1 [2013], Art. 11

510

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

creation of a human life through egg donation, as opposed to an
individual’s decision to save a human life by donating an organ.249
As previously mentioned, the legislature does not regulate egg
donation in the same manner as organ donation.250 Instead, the Internet
provides private companies with the opportunity to obtain eggs from
willing donors and, thereafter, allocate the eggs to willing recipients.251
The major concern associated with adopting a market approach to organ
donation is the potential abuse of such a system.252 Opponents against
adopting a market system for organ donation allege it results in
problems such as economic coercion, a reduction in altruism, and the
creation of unequal access to organs depending on the wealth of the
recipient.253 Yet, these same problems are similarly associated with the
current egg procurement system.254
First, economic coercion applies only if the price of an organ is large
enough to override any ethical concerns associated with becoming a
donor.255 Currently, egg donation prices, which range from $5000 to
$10,000 per donation, are within a price range that could cause
See supra Part III.B (acknowledging the legislature developed statutes to protect
against the sale of organs but has not similarly restricted compensation for egg donors).
250
See 42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(1) (2006) (omitting eggs or sperm from the definition of a
human organ, which means that NOTA does not prohibit the sale of such bodily tissues);
see also Gordon, supra note 133 (identifying that the U.S. government does not regulate egg
donation like other foreign countries, including the United Kingdom and Canada).
251
See EGG DONATION INC, https://www.eggdonor.com/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2013) and
THE EGG DONOR PROGRAM, http://www.eggdonation.com/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2013) for
examples of internet websites responsible for procuring egg donors.
252
See Daar, supra note 121, at 54 (“There is no compelling arguments against the sale of
organs per se. . . . It is the potential abuse which is worrying.”). But see Andrews, supra
note 121, at 28 (“A market in body parts and products [is needed] . . . to ensure that
patients are protected from coercion and given the chance to be paid fairly for their
contributions.”).
253
See infra notes 255–62 and accompanying text (refuting the arguments against
adopting a market system for organ donation).
254
See infra notes 256, 259, 262 and accompanying text (explaining that the shortcomings
of adopting a market system for organ donation are similarly associated with the egg donor
process).
255
See KASERMAN & BARNETT, supra note 121, at 76–77 (identifying the shortcomings of
the argument that adoption of a market system will result in economic coercion of the
poor). See generally Young, supra note 132 (explaining the high costs of undergoing an
organ transplant). According to one article, a woman ended an altercation with her
boyfriend by removing a small gun from her purse and committing suicide. Id. The
woman’s family consented to the removal and transplantation of their daughter’s heart,
corneas, and liver, along with some bones and skin. Id. However, receiving no
compensation for such donation, the family could not even afford a headstone for their
daughter, and instead buried her in an unmarked grave. Id. Meanwhile, the doctors,
surgeons, transplant agency, and hospitals responsible for performing the transplantation
procedures obtained thousands of dollars. Id.
249
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financially unsteady individuals to dismiss any ethical concerns
associated with egg donation.256 Government monitoring of the market
system would, however, reduce the coercive impact of operating under a
market approach.257
Second, opponents contend that a market approach would reduce
the altruistic nature of organ donation because those who donate organs
for a sense of volunteerism will no longer want to donate under a market
system.258 This concern is also unwarranted because studies analyzing
the motivation of egg donors show that altruism, financial
compensation, or, more commonly, both motivate individuals.259
The final concern with adopting a market system for organ donation
addresses the concern of unequal access to organs.260 Commentators
allege that under a market approach the wealthy have greater access to
organs because of their wealth and that such privileged access would
leave the poor helpless.261 Yet, egg donation also allows for unequal
access; in fact, unequal access exists regarding all commodities or
services operating under a market system in the United States.262
See Cost Estimate for Egg Donation, supra note 24 (discussing an itemized list of
expenses associated with compensating an egg donor, which includes travel expenses for
out-of-state donors); Egg Donor Compensation, supra note 24 (recognizing that clinics
compensate egg donors anywhere from $5000 to $10,000 for their services); see also Rabin,
supra note 161 (providing the story of a woman who, after graduate school, donated eggs to
an infertile couple, primarily because of the money).
257
See KASERMAN & BARNETT, supra note 121, at 76 (identifying that the economic
coercion argument fails because those opponents fail to distinguish between organ
procurement markets and organ allocation markets). In essence, “[p]aying a family to
agree to organ donation is no more coercive than paying a coal miner to work in the mine,
a professor to teach, or a surgeon to provide medical services.” Id.
258
See id. at 79 (stating that a market approach may discourage donors with an altruistic
intent from donating their organs upon death); see also U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., supra note 1 (detailing the altruistic process of organ donation).
259
See Gordon, supra note 133 (reporting that research of eighty egg donors revealed
women’s motivation for becoming an egg donor varied). Around 30% of donors were
motivated solely by the altruism of egg donation, whereas 20% claimed that money alone
was their motivation. Id. About 40% recognized that both the altruism and promise of
money was why they chose to become an egg donor. Id.; see Egg Donor Compensation, supra
note 224 (claiming that egg donation is an altruistic act because it gives the gift of life, and
compensation does not serve as the primary motivation but only as reimbursement to
donors for their time and effort).
260
See KASERMAN & BARNETT, supra note 121, at 78 (stating that individuals “fear that, if
organs are purchased from suppliers, only wealthy individuals will be able to afford
transplants”).
261
See id. (explaining that an alleged shortcoming of a market system is unequal access
because the wealthy have greater access to obtain organs).
262
See Cost Estimate for Egg Donation, supra note 24 (discussing an itemized list of fees
associated with egg donation that end up totaling around $14,850 plus additional expenses
ranging from $5500 to $8000 for travel).
256
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Therefore, although the personal autonomy associated with being an
egg donor could extend to organ donors, it seems that a more
appropriate, supervised approach could benefit both systems.263 Rather
than adopting an unsupervised market approach to organ donation, Part
IV of this Note proposes that the legislature amend NOTA to implement
a supervised market system governing both egg and organ donation.264
The government’s supervision of the market system would help prevent
coercion and corruption of individuals and their families.265
IV. CONTRIBUTION
Although there are many risks associated with adopting a market
approach, a market system to organ donation would most effectively
alleviate the organ shortage that currently exists throughout our
This Part proposes that Congress amend NOTA and
nation.266
implement a supervised market approach—governing both the organ
and egg donation systems—that appropriately safeguards against the
risks associated with a market system.267 First, this Part suggests that
these amendments include female eggs within the definition of a human
organ under NOTA.268 Second, this Part proposes an amendment that
implements a supervised market system for egg and organ donation,
which would effectively safeguard against the risks of adopting a market
approach.269 This system will allow for individuals to receive effective
compensation for their donated organs and eggs, while also increasing
the organ supply and consequently reducing the shortage of available
organs.270

263
See SCOTT, supra note 122, at 190 (recognizing that markets for human body parts
already exist for blood, blood products, sperm, and even human hair). In fact, individuals
sold human hair and teeth on the open market as early as the Elizabethan era. Id. at 180.
264
See infra Part IV (suggesting an amendment to NOTA).
265
See infra Part IV (proposing an amendment to NOTA that would establish a
supervised market approach for organ and egg donation).
266
See supra Part III.C (identifying the risks associated with a market system to organ
donation).
267
See supra Part III (recognizing that the current organ donation system operating under
an altruistic model has failed to alleviate the current organ shortage within the United
States); infra Part IV.A (proposing an amendment to NOTA).
268
See infra note 273 (proposing an amendment to the definition of human organ).
269
See infra notes 274–75 (suggesting language that provides for an exemption to the
current prohibition against the sale of human organs under NOTA).
270
See Statz, supra note 109 (recognizing that the 1968 UAGA failed to increase the supply
of organs as much as expected); infra Part IV.B (explaining the positive implications of
adopting the proposed amendment).
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A. Proposed Amendment
This Part proposes an amendment to NOTA that reads as follows:271
(a) Prohibition
It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly acquire,
receive, or otherwise transfer any human organ for
valuable consideration for use in human transplantation
if the transfer affects interstate commerce.
The
preceding sentence does not apply with respect to
human organ paired donation or the Human Organ
Procurement Organization Market System.272
....
(c) Definitions
For purposes of subsection (a) of this section:
(1) The term "human organ" means the human
(including fetal) kidney, liver, heart, lung, pancreas,
bone marrow, cornea, eye, bone, ovum,273 and skin or
any subpart thereof and any other human organ (or
any subpart thereof, including that derived from a
fetus) specified by the Secretary of Health and
Human Services by regulation.
(2) The term "valuable consideration" does not
include the reasonable payments associated with the
removal, transportation, implantation, processing,
preservation, quality control, and storage of a
human organ or the expenses of travel, housing, and
lost wages incurred by the donor of a human organ
in connection with the donation of the organ.
....

271
This Note proposes amending 42 U.S.C § 274e (2006). The text of NOTA appears in
ordinary Times New Roman type, and the amendments are italicized.
272
The proposed amendments are italicized and are the contribution of the author. This
proposed revision would adopt a supervised market system and create an exemption
under NOTA. The proposed amendment relates to both living and deceased donors
because NOTA governs the sale of human organs regardless of whether the donor is
deceased or living.
273
This Note proposes including ovum within the definition of human organ, which in
turn allows for more oversight regarding the female egg procurement process. Although
the author acknowledges that ovum are not considered a human organ in the narrow sense
of the term, arguably the term bone currently found within the definition of human organ
is also not generally considered a human organ. Thus, including ovum within the
definition of “human organ” is appropriate.
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(5) The term “Human Organ Procurement Organization
Market System” (“HOPOMS”) refers to the
compensation for human organ donation when an
individual meets all of the following conditions:274
(A) An individual receives the human organ from the
Organ Procurement Organization, acting as a broker
for the organ donation process;
(B) Compensation for the human organ does not
exceed $10,000;
(C) The donor properly executed the necessary
paperwork, which shall ensure a good faith basis for
retrieving the organ and a lack of coercion;
(D) In the case of a living donor, the donor registered
with the Organ Procurement Organization to receive
and submit follow-up information regarding their
health conditions following the donation process;
(E) In the case of a deceased donor, the donor
registered
with
the
Organ
Procurement
Organization prior to death, and made arrangements
with the Organ Procurement Organization relating
to what tissues or organs are to be donated;
(F) A donee registered with the Organ Procurement
Organization to receive and submit follow-up
information regarding their health conditions
following the donation process; and
(G) Other than described in paragraph (B), no other
valuable consideration was acquired, received, or
otherwise transferred with respect to the human
organ referred to in such subparagraph.275

274
The author modeled this language after the “human organ paired donation”
exemption currently found within NOTA. See 42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(4) (providing the
language relating to “human organ paired donation”). The amendment differs because
rather than outlining numerous circumstances that would comply with the exception,
under the amendment individuals must fulfill all of the applicable criteria before the
exemption applies. However, the donor need only comply with either subsection (D) or (E)
of the exception, depending on the circumstances. Mandating compliance with all of the
criteria helps ensure proper government oversight and allows for research and regulation
of the system.
275
The author modeled this language after the “human organ paired donation”
exemption currently found within NOTA. See 42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(4) (outlining the human
organ paired donation exemption). The maximum amount of $10,000 merely identifies the
higher range of the compensation. However, this proposed amendment should undergo
research by the legislature to determine if this amount is too large and thus will
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B. Commentary
The amended language of NOTA serves two valuable purposes.
First, the language includes female eggs or ova within the definition of
human organ.276 This prohibits individuals from paying valuable
consideration for female eggs that do not meet the exemption’s
requirements and also allows for greater oversight and control regarding
the egg donation process.277 Second, and most importantly, the
amendment establishes an exemption known as the Human Organ
Procurement Organization Market System (“HOPOMS”).
This
exemption is, in many respects, analogous to NOTA’s human organ
paired donation exemption.278
Under HOPOMS, so long as an individual meets the criteria outlined
in the exemption, he will not be liable for punishment under NOTA.279
In essence, this provision creates a special exemption for liability.280 The
HOPOMS exemption mandates that the Organ Procurement
Organizations act as brokers. This allows for Organ Procurement
Organizations to ensure that donors receive valuable consideration for
their organs and, similarly, that donees obtain organs without
overpaying on the black market.281
Furthermore, by setting a maximum amount of compensation for
organs, the amendments allow the government to safeguard against
exploitation of the poor.282 Also, by requiring that individuals comply
with the proposed paperwork identifying their good faith basis for
donating, Organ Procurement Organizations are able to safeguard
against liability under NOTA. Under the current language of NOTA,
economically coerce individuals into donating their organs during financially difficult
times.
276
See supra note 273 (explaining why the amendment includes ovum in the definition of
human organ).
277
See supra notes 250–54 and accompanying text (identifying the lack of procedural
safeguards and medical research governing the egg donation process).
278
See supra note 274 (explaining that the author modeled the amendment after the
“human organ paired donation”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(4) (recognizing various
circumstances under which paired organ donation is exempt from NOTA).
279
See supra notes 274–75 and accompanying text (identifying the criteria required to
meet the added exemption under NOTA).
280
See 42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(4) (identifying that human organ paired donation is exempt
from liability under NOTA). The human organ paired donation exemption is similar to the
proposed amendments under Part IV of this Note.
281
See supra note 213 and accompanying text (identifying that a black market has
developed due to the current national shortage for organs).
282
See supra notes 260–61 and accompanying text (recognizing the argument that a
market approach will not necessarily cause exploitation but could contribute to further
inequities in organ procurement).
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Organ Procurement Organizations are not exempt if they violate any of
the provisions therein.283
Finally, the proposed amendments also require that Organ
Procurement Organizations, or a subsection thereof, follow up with all
living donors and donees.
This requirement will address the
problematic lack of medical research regarding the long-term
consequences of egg donation by creating a larger research base
regarding the risks of organ and egg donation.284
Although the proposed amendment would help to alleviate many of
the issues concerning the present organ shortage, critics may argue that
economic coercion, losing the altruistic nature of donation, and unequal
access are still concerns in implementing a supervised market
approach.285 First, as mentioned above, economic coercion would not
present an issue because there is a maximum amount of compensation
that parties could exchange for an organ.286 Although the proposed
amendment identifies a maximum figure of $10,000, the legislature
should further research whether the $10,000 maximum figure is
unreasonable.287 The amount should be a number that it is not so overly
large that it would encourage financially unsteady individuals to dismiss
ethical issues associated with donating their organs or eggs.288 Second,
the altruistic nature of donation will still exist because the HOPOMS
exception does not completely remove the possibility of donating organs
with an altruistic motivation.289 Individuals may still donate organs
without receiving compensation, and studies have shown that altruism,

283
See 42 U.S.C. § 274e (failing to recognize any Organ Procurement Organization
exemption from liability).
284
See supra notes 240–41 and accompanying text (recognizing the lack of medical
research pertaining to the egg donation process).
285
See supra text accompanying notes 250–62 (explaining the arguments against adopting
a market approach for organ donation and demonstrating how those same arguments
could apply to the current market approach for egg donation).
286
See supra note 255 and accompanying text (explaining that economic coercion is one
concern of adopting a market approach); supra note 275 (explaining that the maximum
amount should depend on the research conducted by the legislature).
287
See supra note 275 (discussing that the legislature should investigate whether the
$10,000 figure is too high and thus may potentially coerce financially unstable individuals
to donate their organs or eggs).
288
See supra text accompanying note 255 (explaining the importance in selecting a
reasonable price for compensation).
289
See supra note 258 and accompanying text (recognizing that another concern in
adopting a market approach to organ donation is removing the altruistic nature to donate);
supra notes 274–75 (illustrating that the proposed language is one exception and would not
necessarily alter the typical donation process).
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financial compensation, or more commonly both motivate donors.290
Lastly, the concern of unequal access is also not an issue under the
proposed amendment because providing compensation under some
circumstances does not completely alleviate the current methods in place
for organ donation.291 In fact, HOPOMS is one exception that only
applies if individuals meet all of the conditions.292 States would still use
the regular process for organ donation if a donor failed to register with
the organ procurement organization before death and would only use
the HOPOMS exception if the donor satisfied all the above criteria
outlined thereunder.293
Overall, the current state of organ donation requires that the federal
government take action to help alleviate the current shortage of organs
throughout the United States. Together, the preceding amendments
would effectively safeguard against abuse of the market system for
organ and egg donation.294 The similarities between organ and egg
procurement procedures mandate that the legislature take steps to
govern both similarly.295
V. CONCLUSION
Courts have failed to recognize an absolute property right in the
human body, which has prevented individuals from bringing claims for
conversion and receiving compensation for their misappropriated
organs.296 In addition, although NOTA expressly bans the sale of organs
for valuable consideration, its prohibitions do not include female
reproductive eggs.297 The current organ procurement policy is failing to
290
See supra text accompanying note 259 (identifying that women are motivated to
donate their eggs for various reasons).
291
See supra notes 260–61 and accompanying text (explaining that unequal access is
another concern associated with adopting a market approach to organ donation); supra
notes 274–75 and accompanying text (creating an additional exemption that would allow
for individuals to obtain compensation but not otherwise altering the organ donation
process to mandate compensation).
292
See supra note 274 and accompanying text (recognizing that individuals must meet all
of the exception’s elements to escape liabilty under NOTA).
293
See supra notes 274–75 and accompanying text (establishing an exception to the
prohibition on paying or receiving compensation for organs, but otherwise not significantly
altering the organ donation process).
294
See supra Part III.C (identifying the potential risks of abuse in adopting a market
system).
295
See supra Part III.C (pointing out the similarities between the egg procurement and
organ procurement processes).
296
See supra Part II.A (recognizing that courts have failed to identify an absolute property
right in the human body, which has limited the types of claims individuals can pursue).
297
See supra Part II.B.2 (outlining the requirements of NOTA and defining the term
human organ).
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meet the demand for organs, thus the legislature should implement the
proposed NOTA amendments, which will allow for increased oversight
of the egg donation process while also implementing a supervised
market system for organ and egg donation.298
Returning to the stories of Melinda and Colter—“What makes
Melinda more worthy of obtaining the gift of life compared to Colter?”299
This Note establishes that there is essentially no difference. Under the
current organ and egg donation systems, Melinda was able to
compensate an individual and receive the gift of life through a new born
child.300 However, the Meinart family instead was forced to take a waitand-see approach as to whether Colter would receive the life-saving
transplant he needs.301 The proposed amendments would resolve the
current discrepancies between Colter’s and Melinda’s stories by allowing
both Colter and Melinda the opportunity to comply with the HOPOMS
exception and compensate an individual to receive a life-changing gift.302
Both organ donation and egg donation involve life-altering processes.
Thus, the legislature should enact the proposed amendments to NOTA
and ensure that Colter and Melinda each have the equal opportunity to
receive the gift of life.303
Janelle E. Thompson*
298
See supra Part IV (suggesting various amendments to NOTA that include: placing
female eggs within the definition of human organ and adopting a supervised market
approach to organ donation).
299
See supra Part I (discussing Colter’s and Melinda’s donation experiences).
300
See supra text accompanying note 24 (explaining that NOTA allows Melinda to pay a
woman who donates her eggs).
301
See supra text accompanying note 25 (recognizing that current legislation prohibits the
Meinart family from compensating anyone willing to donate their organ to Colter).
302
See supra notes 271–75 and accompanying text (outlining the language for the
proposed amendment to NOTA).
303
See supra Part IV (discussing an amendment to NOTA that would ensure the market
approach adopted for organ and egg donation receives supervision).
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